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EXTENDING THE SEX-PLUS 
DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE TO AGE 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS INVOLVING 
MULTIPLE DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVES 
MARC CHASE MCALLISTER* 
Abstract: Federal employment discrimination statutes make it unlawful to 
discriminate against employees on the basis of certain protected characteris-
tics, including race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and age. 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may not discrim-
inate against an employee based on a combination of two protected traits, such 
as race and sex. Nevertheless, these claims—which this Article refers to as 
multiple-motive claims—tend to fail when one of the protected traits is age. 
Whether brought under Title VII or under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (ADEA), this Article argues that courts should authorize 
discrimination claims combining age with some other immutable characteris-
tic, like race or gender, and proposes an amendment to the ADEA that would 
authorize such claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under federal employment discrimination statutes, employees may be 
protected against workplace discrimination due to their membership in cer-
tain protected classes, including race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
disability, and age.1 Discrimination claims typically allege that an employer 
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 1 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) 
(2012) (making it unlawful to discriminate against employees on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, col-
or, religion, sex, or national origin”); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) § 102, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of disabil-
ity). Other significant federal statutes include the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 (GINA) § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012), which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of genetic information; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), 
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has treated employees in a protected class differently than those outside the 
protected class, such as where an employer promotes male but not equally-
qualified female employees,2 or where an employer imposes different 
workplace requirements on employees of different races.3 In some instanc-
es, however, an employee claims discrimination due to a combination of 
protected traits, such as race and gender, rather than either trait alone.4 This 
Article refers to these types of claims as “multiple-motive” claims.5  
When such multiple-motive claims involve Title VII protected classes, 
courts generally permit such claims.6 Courts agree, for example, that a 
black female may claim discrimination based on her membership in a par-
ticular subclass of female employees, rather than against female employees 
as a whole, due to discrimination on the basis of both race and sex, each of 
which are protected under Title VII.7 Courts are split, however, regarding 
whether to permit multiple-motive claims when age discrimination is al-
leged under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),8 
such that an older female in the ADEA’s protected class of forty-and-older 
employees9 often cannot claim she was treated differently than women un-
der forty (as opposed to all younger employees of both sexes).10 This is true 
even though the discriminatory variables—sex and race in the Title VII con-
                                                                                                                           
which states that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy; and, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), Pub. L. 93-112, 87 
Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)), which prohibits discrimination against 
federal government employees based on disabilities. 
 2 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1989). 
 3 See, e.g., Vazquez v. Caesar’s Palace Stream Resort, No. 3:CV-09-0625, 2013 WL 
6244568, at *2, *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff, an African-American em-
ployee, brought a successful race discrimination claim where she was fired for wearing her hair in 
braids while a white employee was not). 
 4 See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir. 1987) (deeming 
black women a protected subclass under Title VII); Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 
615 F.2d 1025, 1032–33 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). 
 5 Cf. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–92 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the concepts of “mixed-motives” and “multiple-motives”). 
 6 See infra notes 86–123 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra note 102 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 8 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 623–634. 
 9 See id. § 623(a) (making it unlawful to discriminate against employees on the basis of age); 
id. § 631(a) (limiting the ADEA’s protection to those employees who are at least forty years of 
age). 
 10 See infra notes 180–225 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Johnson Cty., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187–88 (D. Kan. 2000) (stating that because “[p]laintiff’s 
age-plus-gender claim is based on defendants’ alleged discrimination against . . . older women . . . 
plaintiff must show differential treatment between herself and younger women” to prevail). 
472 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:469 
text, and sex and age in the ADEA context—each involve protected classifi-
cations and immutable characteristics the employee cannot change.11 
From this jurisprudential backdrop, this Article examines two age-
related issues that have splintered courts. First, this Article considers whether 
Title VII discrimination claims combining sex and age should be recognized 
as valid under well-established “sex-plus” discrimination doctrine,12 and ar-
gues that such claims should be permitted to combat discrimination against 
female employees aged forty and older.13 Next, this Article considers the 
analogous issue of “age-plus” discrimination claims under the ADEA and 
argues that such claims should be permitted when the ADEA’s protected 
characteristic, age, is combined with another immutable characteristic, like 
race or gender.14 
Although there are numerous arguments for extending the sex-plus 
discrimination doctrine in this manner, this Article primarily points to estab-
lished sex-plus discrimination precedents as evidence that discrimination 
against subclasses of protected employees (such as black females) should 
not go unpunished, and argues that subgroups of employees in the ADEA’s 
protected class (such as females aged forty or older) deserve the same pro-
tections.15 In addition, this Article addresses the primary obstacle to plus 
discrimination claims under the ADEA, namely, the requirement that an 
ADEA plaintiff prove that his or her age was the but-for cause of the em-
ployer’s adverse action,16 which, according to some courts, precludes mul-
tiple-motive ADEA claims.17 Despite the apparent textual basis for these 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089–92 (5th Cir. 1975) (dis-
cussing the courts’ application of sex-plus discrimination doctrine to sex-plus immutable charac-
teristics). 
 12 See infra notes 52–179 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 229–252 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 253–341 and accompanying text; see also Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033 (ex-
plaining that sex-plus discrimination claims are permitted where the “plus” factor pertains to an 
immutable characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right). 
 15 See infra notes 226–341 and accompanying text. Even courts rejecting age-plus-sex claims 
have conceded this point. See, e.g., Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 
2015 WL 13574291, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (rejecting sex-plus-age and age-plus-sex 
claims but stating that “the Court is cognizant of plaintiff’s valid argument that an individual 
could be treated unlawfully as a result of both age and gender”). 
 16 See infra notes 184–208 and accompanying text; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (interpreting the ADEA as requiring a plaintiff to prove that his or her 
“age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act” (citations omitted)). 
 17 See, e.g., Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *7–8 (requiring a plaintiff who sought to 
bring combination claims based on age and sex to argue exclusively sex discrimination under Title 
VII, and exclusively age discrimination under the ADEA). 
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rulings,18 which this Article contends is overstated,19 requiring an age-plus 
plaintiff to argue age discrimination exclusively distorts the true nature of 
the plaintiff’s subgroup discrimination claim and changes the relevant com-
parator, making the resulting pure age discrimination claim more difficult to 
prove.20 Moreover, precluding such combination claims under the ADEA 
effectively rewards employers for exercising not just one discriminatory 
motive against a particular employee, such as age, but multiple discrimina-
tory motives, such as age and sex. Nevertheless, given important textual 
differences between Title VII and the ADEA,21 courts may remain hesitant 
to recognize ADEA plus discrimination claims.22 Accordingly, this Article 
proposes that Congress amend the ADEA to state that an ADEA plaintiff 
may prevail upon proof that his or her age was “a motivating factor for an 
adverse employment action, even though other discriminatory or illegiti-
mate factors may have also motivated the employer.”23 
Before examining these arguments, Part I of this Article summarizes 
the core differences between sex discrimination claims brought pursuant to 
Title VII and age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA.24 Part II 
then analyzes various Title VII plus discrimination claims endorsed by 
courts, including cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex-plus-
race, and race-plus-religion.25 Moving to age-related claims, Part III sum-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stating that an unlawful employment practice under 
Title VII is proven when “the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice”), with Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (holding that, unlike Title VII claims, to 
prevail on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must prove “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the chal-
lenged adverse employment action”); see also Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 53 
(1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting an employer’s argument in a sex-plus case that a plaintiff must prove 
that the discrimination would not have occurred but for her gender because “Title VII requires no 
such proof”; rather, Title VII “bars discrimination when sex is ‘a motivating factor,’ not ‘the mo-
tivating factor’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m))). 
 19 See infra notes 254–320 and accompanying text.  
 20 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032–33 (recognizing that “[i]f both black men and white wom-
en are considered to be within the same protected class as black females for purposes of the 
[McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) test] . . . no remedy will exist for dis-
crimination which is directed only toward black females”); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 
1238 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing that if plaintiff’s “sex-plus-age” claim is not viable under Title 
VII, then she must instead present two separate claims—“one for sex discrimination and another 
for age discrimination”—neither of which would survive summary judgment). 
 21 See supra note 18. 
 22 See, e.g., Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal.), aff’d, 167 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Cal. 
1996) (rejecting the “age-plus” theory of discrimination in part because allowing a plaintiff “to 
aggregate claims under four completely different statutes, as an extension of ‘sex-plus’ theories of 
discrimination, would amount to judicial legislation”). 
 23 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 24 See infra notes 29–51 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 52–123 and accompanying text. 
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marizes the split among courts regarding Title VII sex-plus-age claims26 and 
Part IV examines a related judicial split on ADEA age-plus discrimination 
claims.27 Finally, Part V argues that Title VII should be read to authorize sex-
plus-age discrimination claims, that ADEA age-plus discrimination claims are 
valid as well, and finally, that an amendment to the ADEA would help clarify 
the law regarding multiple-motive claims.28 
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Federal employment discrimination statutes protect employees against 
workplace discrimination on the basis of a number of protected characteris-
tics, such as race or religion.29 Regardless of the protected category at issue, 
employees usually assert one of four types of claims: disparate treatment,30 
disparate impact,31 harassment,32 or retaliation.33 Although all four claims 
are generally available across the federal anti-discrimination statutes, vic-
tims of employment discrimination usually pursue claims of disparate 
treatment, which require proof of intentional discrimination, or claims of 
disparate impact, which do not.34 
The most comprehensive federal statute governing employment dis-
crimination is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it un-
lawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin.35 Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965, and 
was amended in 1991 to clarify that a violation of the statute may be proven 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 124–179 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 180–225 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 226–341 and accompanying text. 
 29 See supra note 1. 
 30 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988). 
 31 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting the ADEA as 
authorizing recovery on a disparate impact theory); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 
(1971) (authorizing disparate impact claims under Title VII). 
 32 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (authorizing sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII); Rickard v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 773 F.3d 181, 184–
85 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing workplace harassment claims based on either sex or age). 
 33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) (making it unlawful under Title VII “for an employ-
er to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing under this subchapter”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) (making it unlawful under the 
ADEA “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by [the ADEA], or 
because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter”). 
 34 Watson, 487 U.S. at 986–87. 
 35 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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when “the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other [non-discriminatory] factors also motivated the practice.”36 
Before the 1991 amendments, if a Title VII plaintiff proved that his or 
her protected characteristic “played a motivating part in an employment 
decision,” the defendant could avoid liability by proving “that it would have 
made the same decision even if [it] had not taken [that factor] into ac-
count.”37 In other words, a defendant that acted with a discriminatory mo-
tive could still completely avoid liability if it had some additional non-
discriminatory motivation for its employment decision.38 In changing the 
law on such “mixed-motive” claims, Congress’s addition of a “motivating 
factor” standard in Title VII effectively expanded the relief available to a 
plaintiff who could demonstrate that an unlawful criterion played a “moti-
vating part” in an employment decision, even though the employer was able 
to show that it would have made the same decision regardless.39 
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA protects employees from discrimination 
“because of such individual’s age,”40 a protection that is limited to those 
aged forty and older.41 Although the ADEA tracks much of the language of 
Title VII, including the statute’s “because of” language preceding its deline-
ation of protected classifications,42 the ADEA contains one key difference. 
Unlike Title VII, which was amended to authorize discrimination claims 
where an improper consideration was “a motivating factor” for an employer’s 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 37 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
 38 See id.; see also id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that in “pretext” cases, 
“the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the ‘true’ motives behind 
the decision,” whereas in “mixed-motives” cases, “there is no one ‘true’ motive behind the deci-
sion,” which is instead “a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate” (citations 
omitted)); L. Camille Hébert, Redefining the Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the 
Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 55 (1990) (explaining the concept of pretext as one where the employer has “purpose or intent,” 
because “‘pretext’ is ‘a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the 
real intention or state of affairs’” (citations omitted)). 
 39 Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 552 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
 41 Id. § 631(a). 
 42 Compare id. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age”), 
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
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adverse action,43 the ADEA does not contain an analogous provision.44 Ra-
ther, the ADEA’s causation standard is limited to the phrase, “because of . . . 
age.”45  
Interpreting the ADEA’s “because of . . . age” requirement, the Su-
preme Court ruled in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. that an ADEA 
plaintiff in any disparate treatment action “must prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse 
employment action.”46 Thus, in an ADEA case, unlike a Title VII case, a 
plaintiff may not prevail by showing that age was simply “a motivating fac-
tor” if another, non-discriminatory factor also motivated the employer.47 
Rather, an ADEA plaintiff must prove that he suffered an adverse employ-
ment action “because of” his age.48 Accordingly, under the ADEA, there is 
no such thing as a so-called “mixed-motive” claim—i.e., one involving a 
combination of both legitimate and illegitimate motives.49 In addition, no 
mixed-motive “‘same decision’ affirmative defense” exists under the 
ADEA: the employer either acted “‘because of’ the plaintiff’s age or it did 
not.”50 The plaintiff’s age must be the employer’s “one ‘true’ motive.”51 
II. PLUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
As noted, Title VII prevents employers from taking adverse action 
against employees on the basis of sex, among other immutable characteris-
tics.52 Under the sex-plus doctrine, a plaintiff, often female, may bring a 
Title VII claim for sex discrimination if she can show that her employer 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 44 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173–75 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 45 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
 46 Gross, 557 U.S. at 180; see also id. at 177–78 (recognizing that “the burden of persuasion 
necessary to establish employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motives cases as in any 
other ADEA disparate-treatment action,” where “[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the chal-
lenged employer decision” (emphasis added)). 
 47 See id. at 173–75 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 48 See Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 49 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 178–80; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259–60 (White, J., 
concurring). 
 50 Mora, 597 F.3d at 1204; see also Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (“The burden of persuasion does 
not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when 
a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.”). 
 51 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring). 
 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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discriminated against her not because of her gender per se, but because of 
the combination of her gender plus some additional factor.53 
As courts have developed the doctrine, the additional “plus” factor in a 
sex-plus case must pertain either to an immutable characteristic or a funda-
mental right.54 In the immutable characteristic category, for example, if an 
employer discriminates against black females, an employee within that par-
ticular subclass may claim discrimination even though the employer does 
not discriminate against either blacks as a whole (including black men) or 
females as a whole (including white women).55 In the fundamental right 
category, for example, if an employer refuses to hire women with children 
but has no such hiring policy for men with children, that employer’s differ-
ential treatment between genders based on the additional factor of having 
children (representing the exercise of a fundamental right) constitutes dis-
crimination, particularly when that employer’s decision is based on a gender 
stereotype the law seeks to eradicate.56 
At its core, then, “sex-plus claims are a flavor of gender discrimination 
claims where an employer classifies employees on the basis of sex plus an-
other characteristic.”57 In this sense, sex-plus claims represent a form of 
subgroup discrimination, in which an employer treats only a particular seg-
ment of male or female employees in a discriminatory manner.58 As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, “[t]he term 
‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a heuristic developed . . . to affirm that plaintiffs can 
[claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfavored class 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing that in 
sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether the employer took an adverse employ-
ment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex,” and applying the sex-plus theory to a 
plaintiff who was allegedly discriminated against at least in part because of the plaintiff’s gender 
where the “plus-factor” was sexual orientation (citation omitted)). 
 54 Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980); Arnett v. 
Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 55 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034. 
 56 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–45 (1971) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); see also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing sex-plus 
discrimination and concluding that, under Title VII, “an employer is not free to assume that a 
woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of family responsibili-
ties”; rather, “[t]he essence of Title VII in this context is that women have the right to prove their 
mettle in the work arena without the burden of stereotypes regarding whether they can fulfill their 
responsibilities”); Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating 
that the sex-plus theory “recognizes that it is impermissible to treat men with an additional charac-
teristic more or less favorably than women with the same additional characteristic”). 
 57 See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 58 See Myers v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, Inc., 701 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that “[t]he point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination theory is to allow 
Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment when the defendant employer does not discrimi-
nate against all members of the sex”). 
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are discriminated against.”59 For this reason, an employer in a sex-plus case 
cannot justify its discriminatory actions towards a particular subgroup of 
women simply by pointing to its favorable treatment of other women out-
side that particular subgroup.60  
Section A of this Part examines sex-plus claims involving a fundamen-
tal right.61 Section B of this Part examines plus claims involving immutable 
characteristics, including claims involving sex-plus-race and race-plus-
religion.62  
A. Title VII Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving  
a Fundamental Right 
The Supreme Court first held that Title VII could be violated by an 
employer’s discriminatory treatment of a subclass of women in 1971 in 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.63 In Phillips, the Court unanimously 
found that an employer could be liable for sex discrimination for its policy 
of refusing to employ women with pre-school age children, without a simi-
lar rule for men with such children.64 Overturning a grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant, the Court explained that Title VII “requires that 
persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespec-
tive of their sex,” a principle that was likely violated by the employer’s 
gender-based hiring policy.65 Focusing on the rights of the particular affect-
ed individuals, i.e., women with pre-school age children, the Court thus 
deemed it irrelevant that 75–80% of the persons hired for the position at 
issue were women (albeit those without young children) because gender 
discrimination occurred through the use of “one hiring policy for women 
and another for men.”66 
In a more recent example where the plus factor in a sex-plus claim in-
volved the exercise of a fundamental right, the United States Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                           
 59 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 60 See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543–44 (finding that a policy of refusing to hire women with pre-
school age children discriminates on the basis of sex even though at least 75% of those hired for 
the position were women). 
 61 See infra notes 63–85 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 86–123 and accompanying text. 
 63 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 64 Id. at 544.  
 65 Id. For purposes of remand, the majority clarified that the employer’s hiring policy might 
be upheld if the employer could show that the policy “is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted). Writing separately, Justice Marshall argued that such a 
defense would not be appropriate in this particular case. See id. at 544–47 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). 
 66 Id. at 543–44 (majority opinion). 
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peals for the Second Circuit in 2004 considered a discrimination claim 
brought by school psychologist, Elana Back, after she was denied tenure 
due to an allegedly stereotypical view that young mothers could not balance 
work and home obligations.67 Treating the case as one of “sex stereotyp-
ing”68 against the particular subgroup of women with children, the court 
noted that, as in Phillips, “discrimination against one employee cannot be 
cured . . . solely by favorable . . . treatment of other employees of the same 
. . . sex,”69 as it is the rights of individual employees that truly matter.70 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the employer’s argument that it was immune 
from Back’s allegations of gender discrimination simply because, “in the 
year that Back was hired, 85% of the teachers employed at [the school] 
were women, and 71% of these women had children.”71 Rather, “what mat-
ters is how Back was treated.”72 And on this point, the court found evidence 
that the decision-makers who denied Back tenure had stereotyped her “as a 
woman and mother of young children, and thus treated her differently than 
they would have treated a man and father of young children.”73 Such evi-
dence, according to the court, was enough for Back’s discrimination claim 
to survive summary judgment.74 
In another example of a sex-plus discrimination claim with a plus 
characteristic involving the exercise of a fundamental right, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1997 ruled 
in McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School that a teacher could maintain a Title 
VII sex discrimination claim as a member of a subclass of women with dis-
abled children.75 Finding evidence of discriminatory animus against moth-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Back, 365 F.3d at 113; see also id. at 115 (describing the alleged stereotyping behav-
ior). Notably, Back brought her sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which 
the court found to encompass sex-plus claims. See id. at 117–19 (holding that “[a]n employment 
discrimination plaintiff alleging the violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under § 1983 
alone, and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII” (citations omitted)). 
 68 Id. at 113. 
 69 Id. at 121–22 (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 70 See id. at 122 (noting that “what matters is how Back was treated”). The Supreme Court 
later emphasized this point in subsequent discrimination cases. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 
U.S. 440, 453–55 (1982) (stating that the purpose of Title VII “is the protection of the individual 
employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole,” and explaining that under 
Title VII, “Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against some 
employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the 
employees’ group”). 
 71 Back, 365 F.3d at 122.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 130 (analyzing the evidence of discriminatory motives and comments of plaintiff’s 
supervisors). 
 74 See id. Notably, summary judgment was denied only against the actual decision makers in 
Back’s case. Id. 
 75 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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ers with disabled children, including discriminatory statements made by the 
school’s principal, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that no gen-
der discrimination had occurred because the person ultimately selected for 
the position was also a woman.76 Here, the court found it significant that the 
woman selected for the position was “not a member of the subclass of 
women with disabled children” to which the plaintiff belonged.77 Accord-
ingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff’s 
sex discrimination claim.78 
Phillips, Back, and McGrenaghan are examples of sex-plus discrimi-
nation claims brought by female employees treated differently for having 
children.79 Under the sex-plus doctrine, courts have invalidated discrimina-
tion against subclasses of women based on their exercise of other funda-
mental rights.80 Courts have found, for example, that an employer’s differ-
ential treatment of married women, as opposed to married men, violates 
Title VII.81 
In the sex-plus-marital status cases, as in Phillips, Back, and McGrena-
ghan, courts have rejected employer arguments that there was no discrimi-
nation “on the basis of sex” because the employer did not discriminate 
against women as a whole.82 In one such case, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that an employer’s “no-marriage 
rule”—which it applied only to female flight stewardesses—violated Title 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See supra notes 63–78 and accompanying text; see also Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 48 (1st Cir. 
2009) (affirming denial of summary judgment to defendant-employer on a similar sex-plus dis-
crimination claim); Philipsen v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 
WL 907822, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (recognizing a similar claim, but granting sum-
mary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim due to a lack of evidence that the 
plaintiff was treated differently than males with young children). 
 80 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033 (noting that “courts have [identified meritorious sex-plus 
cases] as involving regulations which concern sex plus an immutable characteristic or a constitu-
tionally protected activity such as marriage or child rearing”). 
 81 See, e.g., Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 
1997) (ruling in a sex-plus-marital status claim that a female plaintiff must show that her male co-
workers with the same marital status were treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for plain-
tiff due to a lack of evidence on that point); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 
(7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a “no-marriage rule” for stewardesses violates Title VII); Gee-
Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 888 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (recognizing a 
sex-plus claim on the basis of sex plus marital and family status, but dismissing plaintiff’s claim 
because she failed to “establish a triable question of fact as to pretext”); Rauw v. Glickman, No. 
CV-99-1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *8–9 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001) (authorizing a sex-plus-
marital status claim under Title VII); Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187–88 (W.D. 
Pa. 1971) (holding that an employer’s refusal to hire married women violated Title VII). 
 82 See, e.g., Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the argument). 
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VII even though the rule did not apply to all female employees, “for so long 
as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application involves a 
discrimination based on sex.”83 Thus, the Seventh Circuit declared, Title 
VII’s effect “is not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects 
only a portion of the protected class.”84 As another court declared, “[i]f [a] 
company discriminates against married women, but not against married 
men, the variable becomes women, and the discrimination, based on solely 
sexual distinctions, invidious and unlawful.”85 
B. Title VII Plus Discrimination Claims Involving  
Immutable Characteristics 
As noted, the sex-plus theory of discrimination applies when discrimi-
nation has occurred against a subclass of male or female employees based 
on either (1) the exercise of a fundamental right, such as the right to marry 
or have children; or (2) an immutable characteristic, such as the plaintiff’s 
race.86 In the past 50 years, courts have recognized various “plus claims” 
under Title VII involving a combination of immutable characteristics—
some protected by Title VII and others protected by different anti-
discrimination statutes.87 Courts have recognized claims of sex-plus-race 
(for example, alleging discrimination against black females88 or against 
Asian females),89 race-plus-religion (for example, alleging discrimination 
against a white Jewish male),90 and most importantly to the instant analysis, 
sex-plus-age (for example, alleging discrimination against older women).91 
This section summarizes exemplary claims involving multiple immutable 
characteristics. 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197–98 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (2012)) (adopting the reason-
ing of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as expressed in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.3(a)). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187. 
 86 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women 
Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 87 (2003) (quoting Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 
(E.D. Pa. 1994)). 
 87 See infra notes 92–123 and accompanying text. 
 88 See, e.g., Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (recognizing a subclass of black women or a sex-plus-
race claim). 
 89 See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a 
subclass of Asian women or a sex-plus-race claim). 
 90 See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient evi-
dence “to support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on the basis of his religion and/or 
race”). 
 91 See, e.g., Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240–41 (recognizing a sub-class of older women or a 
sex-plus-age claim under Title VII). 
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1. Sex-Plus-Race 
In 1980, in a leading case involving sex-plus-race discrimination, Jef-
feries v. Harris County Community Action Association, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against a subclass of black women.92  
In Jefferies, plaintiff Dafro Jefferies, a black female, alleged that her 
employer discriminated against her due to her race and sex.93 The district 
court, however, separated Jefferies’s single discrimination claim into dis-
tinct claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination.94 From there, the 
district court rejected Jefferies’s race discrimination claim because the pro-
motion she sought was instead filled by a black male.95 The court further 
rejected Jefferies’s sex discrimination claim based on evidence that 60-70% 
of the defendant’s employees were female, who often held important posi-
tions within the organization.96 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it improper to separate Jefferies’s 
plus discrimination claim into distinct race and sex discrimination claims,97 
and held that discrimination against black females can exist even in the ab-
sence of discrimination against black men or white women.98 Describing 
“black females as a distinct protected subgroup,” the court noted that no rem-
edy would exist for discrimination directed specifically toward black females 
“[i]f both black men and white women are considered to be within the same 
protected class as black females.”99 Thus, the court concluded that “when a 
Title VII plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against black fe-
males, the fact that black males and white females are not subject to dis-
crimination is irrelevant,”100 as black men and white women must be treated 
as persons outside the particular subclass of black women.101  
                                                                                                                           
 92 615 F.2d at 1034. 
 93 Id. at 1028. In her complaint, Jefferies charged that HCCAA discriminated against her in 
promotion “because she is a woman, up in age and because she is Black.” Id. at 1029. Jefferies’s 
age-based discrimination claim, however, did not materialize as a live issue at trial, and was not 
before the court on appeal. See id. at 1030. 
 94 See id. at 1032 (explaining that the district court did not analyze whether the plaintiff was 
discriminated against “based on a combination of race and sex,” and instead “separately addressed 
Jefferies’s claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination”). 
 95 Id. at 1028; see also id. at 1030 (affirming the district court’s rejection of Jefferies’s claim 
of pure race discrimination in promotion, given that the person promoted to the position at issue 
was also black). 
 96 Id. at 1029–31. 
 97 Id. at 1032. 
 98 Id. at 1034. 
 99 Id. at 1032–33. 
 100 Id. at 1034. 
 101 See id. at 1032, 1034; see also Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1239 (discussing Jefferies). 
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Since Jefferies, numerous courts have ratified sex-plus claims by sub-
classes of employees in similar circumstances.102 In one such case, Lam v. 
University of Hawaii, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized a Title VII plus discrimination claim brought by an Asian 
woman.103 
In Lam, plaintiff Maivan Clech Lam, a woman of Vietnamese descent, 
sued the University of Hawaii, among other defendants, claiming the Uni-
versity’s Law School violated Title VII by discriminating against her on the 
basis of her race, sex, and national origin when it twice rejected her applica-
tion for a faculty position.104 The district court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants as to the initial rejection, and ruled in favor of the defend-
ants after a bench trial as to the second rejection. Lam appealed both deci-
sions.105 
Examining the initial rejection of Lam’s application, and focusing spe-
cifically on Lam’s allegations of race and sex discrimination, the Ninth Cir-
cuit declared that “[o]n summary judgment, the existence of a discriminatory 
motive for the employment decision will generally be the principal ques-
tion.”106 Regarding that issue, Lam presented testimony that the Chair of the 
appointments committee, Professor A., had a biased attitude towards women 
and Asians.107 Lam also presented evidence that another professor who partic-
ipated in the hiring process had stated that the new hire should be male.108 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir. 1987) (adopting 
the reasoning of Jefferies in recognizing a sex-plus-race hostile work environment claim); Robert-
son v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV-01861 (VLB), 2017 WL 326317, at *8 (D. Conn. 
Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that “[a] plaintiff may bring a [discrimination] claim under a combina-
tion of two protected grounds of Title VII, such as race and gender”); Walton v. Vilsack, No. 09-
7627, 2011 WL 3489967, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that a 
“plaintiff cannot present evidence of discrimination against her as an African-American female”); 
Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 
2007) (discussing the issue at length and recognizing a combination claim alleging race plus sex 
discrimination under Title VII); Nieto v. Kapoor, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1140 (D.N.M. 2000) 
(considering evidence of harassment based on both race and sex); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 
629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (treating plaintiff’s race 
and gender discrimination claims as involving “the class of black women”); Graham v. Bendix 
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black woman 
is protected against discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an employer who 
singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat plaintiff’s case by showing 
that white females or black males are not so unfavorably treated.” (citations omitted)). 
 103 40 F.3d at 1561 n.16, 1561–62. 
 104 Id. at 1554, 1558. 
 105 Id. at 1558. 
 106 Id. at 1559. 
 107 Id. at 1560. On this point, the district court found that “the evidence suggests that Profes-
sor A. harbored prejudicial feelings towards Asians and women.” Id. 
 108 Id. 
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According to the Ninth Circuit, this evidence alone was “sufficient to pre-
clude summary judgment for the defendants.”109 
Most significantly, the Ninth Circuit found it erroneous for the district 
court to have relied on the defendants’ favorable treatment of two other 
candidates for the faculty position at issue: the first an Asian man (tending 
to defeat a claim of racial discrimination), and the second a white woman 
(tending to defeat a claim of sex discrimination).110 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the district court apparently viewed racism and sexism as “distinct 
elements amenable to almost mathematical treatment, so that evaluating 
discrimination against an Asian woman became a simple matter of perform-
ing two separate tasks: looking for racism ‘alone’ and looking for sexism 
‘alone,’ with Asian men and white women as the corresponding model vic-
tims.”111 This slicing and dicing of Lam’s plus discrimination claim, accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, failed to account for the fact that “Asian women are 
subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men 
nor by white women.”112 Consequently, they may be targeted for discrimina-
tion “even in the absence of discrimination against [Asian] men or white 
women.”113 Accordingly, the court determined that “when a plaintiff is claim-
ing race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether the employer dis-
criminates on the basis of that combination of factors, not just whether it dis-
criminates against people of the same race or of the same sex.”114 
2. Race-Plus-Religion 
Another Title VII plus discrimination case, Feingold v. New York, de-
cided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2004, 
is particularly significant in that it involved a combination of immutable 
characteristics, race and religion, extending beyond the sex-plus frame-
work.115 
In Feingold, a terminated white, Jewish, and gay administrative law 
judge (ALJ), Larry Feingold, sued his former employer for disparate treat-
ment and a hostile work environment on the basis race, religion, and sexual 
orientation. Feingold later narrowed his claim to one based on race and reli-
                                                                                                                           
 109 Id. at 1560. 
 110 Id. at 1561. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1562. The court noted in a footnote that Asian women are subject to particular ste-
reotypes such as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, and lotus blossom. Id. at 1562 n.21. 
 113 Id. at 1562 (quoting Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032). 
 114 Id. (citations omitted). 
 115 See 366 F.3d at 143. 
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gion.116 To support his claim, Feingold presented evidence that most of his 
colleagues were African-American, non-Jewish, or both, and had expressed 
particular hostility to both whites and Jews.117 Thereafter, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants on all of Feingold’s claims, a 
decision he appealed.118 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on Feingold’s disparate treatment claim.119 Although the 
court did not specifically address the viability of plus discrimination claims 
such as Feingold’s, the court’s analysis of Feingold’s Title VII claim implic-
itly recognized his claim as one combining race and religion.120 In analyz-
ing his prima facie case, for example, the court found that Feingold be-
longed to a protected class by “having alleged discrimination on the basis of 
race and religion.”121 Thereafter, the court found sufficient evidence “to 
support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on the basis of his reli-
gion and/or race,”122 including evidence that “ALJs who were not white and 
Jewish would not have been fired for [making the same decisions that led to 
Feingold’s firing], and indeed, were not penalized when they behaved simi-
larly.”123 Thus, one can infer that the Second Circuit considered Feingold’s 
Title VII claim as one alleging subgroup discrimination against a white 
Jewish employee, as opposed to separate claims of discrimination against 
whites or against Jews. 
III. THE OUTER EDGES OF TITLE VII PLUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
The sex-plus theory of discrimination is not without limitation.124 Spe-
cifically, courts have rejected attempts to claim sex-plus discrimination for 
sex-differentiated grooming or appearance requirements.125 In addition, 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. at 143, 147. 
 117 See id. at 144–45. 
 118 Id. at 143, 148. 
 119 See id. at 152–56. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. at 152. 
 122 Id. at 153. 
 123 Id. (emphasis added). 
 124 See Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(distinguishing cases where courts have accepted sex-plus discrimination from cases where courts 
have rejected sex-plus discrimination claims). 
 125 See, e.g., Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (rejecting a sex-plus discrimination claim where the employer implemented a sex-
differentiated grooming and appearance code that required female employees to wear makeup 
while prohibiting male employees from wearing makeup); see also Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & 
Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (following the majority of federal courts of 
appeals in holding that requiring short hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII). 
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some courts have rejected attempts to claim subgroup discrimination under 
Title VII by older male or female employees, reasoning that because the 
ADEA does not permit a combined age-plus-sex discrimination claim, 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to recast such a claim as a sex-plus-age 
claim under Title VII.126 Section A of this Part examines plus factors that do 
not involve a fundamental right or immutable characteristic.127 Section B of 
this Part then shifts to sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.128 
A. Plus Factors Not Involving a Fundamental Right  
or Immutable Characteristic 
Generally speaking, courts have rejected attempts to claim sex-plus 
discrimination in the context of sex-differentiated grooming codes or other 
workplace appearance requirements, such as employer policies imposing 
different makeup or hair length requirements for men and women.129 Courts 
have rejected such claims because, unlike valid sex-plus claims, the plus 
factor in these cases does not involve an immutable characteristic, such as 
race or national origin, or a constitutionally protected activity, such as mar-
riage or child rearing.130 
In limiting the scope of sex-plus discrimination in this manner, courts 
have sought to effectuate the intent of Congress in prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, which is to ensure equal job opportunity for males 
and females based on their qualifications, rather than their sex.131 For this 
reason, Title VII should “reach any device or policy of an employer which 
serves to deny acquisition and retention of a job or promotion in a job to an 
individual because the individual is either male or female.”132 Articulating 
this equal employment opportunity objective, while also noting the sex-plus 
doctrine’s two primary limitations, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit has explained: 
Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when em-
ployers are barred from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national 
origin. Similarly, an employer cannot have one hiring policy for 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See, e.g., Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291, 
at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 127 See infra notes 129–137 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 138–179 and accompanying text. 
 129 See supra note 125. 
 130 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033. 
 131 See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII). 
 132 Id. 
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men and another for women if the distinction is based on some 
fundamental right. But a hiring policy that distinguishes on some 
other ground, such as grooming codes or length of hair, is related 
more closely to the employer’s choice of how to run his business 
than to equality of employment opportunity.133 
Interpreting these principles, the Fifth Circuit found that the sex-plus 
discrimination doctrine does not apply to an employer’s hair length re-
striction because hair length is not an immutable characteristic, such as the 
employee’s race, nor is it like having pre-school age children, which is also 
“an existing condition not subject to change.”134 Accordingly, “[i]f [an] em-
ployee objects to [such a] grooming code he has the right to reject it by 
looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may choose to sub-
ordinate his preference by accepting the code along with the job.”135  
Or, as the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has ex-
plained, different grooming and appearance standards for men and women, 
such as different hair length requirements, are merely “classifications by sex 
which do not limit employment opportunities by making distinctions based 
on immutable personal characteristics, which do not represent any attempt by 
the employer to prevent the employment of a particular sex, and which do not 
pose distinct employment disadvantages for one sex.”136 Accordingly, the 
sex-plus discrimination doctrine does not encompass such classifications.137 
B. Sex-Plus-Age Discrimination Under Title VII 
Numerous courts have authorized sex-plus-age claims as part of the Ti-
tle VII prohibition against sex discrimination, including the United States 
District Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,138 Northern District 
of Iowa,139 Eastern District of Missouri,140 and Eastern District of Michi-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. (emphases in original). 
 134 Id. at 1091–92 (citation omitted). 
 135 Id. at 1091. 
 136 Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See James v. Teleflex, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-1206, 1998 WL 966009, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 23, 1998) (denying summary judgment for employer on an older female employee’s sex-
plus-age discrimination claim under Title VII); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240–41 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994) (recognizing a “sex-plus-age” claim under Title VII). 
 139 See McGrane v. Proffitt’s Inc., No. C 97-221-MJM, 2000 WL 34030843, at *7 (N.D. 
Iowa Dec. 26, 2000) (recognizing a “sex-plus age” claim under Title VII as a valid “sex” discrim-
ination claim, and stating, “[a]lthough the theory of sex-plus age discrimination has yet to be put 
squarely before the Eighth Circuit, there is nothing in the Circuit’s precedent that would lead this 
Court to believe such a claim is not viable under Title VII”). 
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gan,141 among others.142 However, not all courts agree that Title VII sex-
plus-age claims are valid.143 
1. Courts Rejecting Title VII Sex-Plus-Age Discrimination Claims 
In numerous cases where a female employee aged forty or older 
claimed discrimination on the basis of sex-plus-age in violation of Title VII, 
courts have rejected the claim as unsupported by evidence, thus either refus-
ing to decide whether such claims are viable144 or failing to discuss the is-
sue in depth.145 Some courts, however, have outright rejected the attempt to 
combine sex and age on the basis that authorizing such claims, even under 
Title VII, might permit plaintiffs to circumvent the ADEA’s unique but-for 
causation principles.146 Perhaps the best example is a 2015 opinion of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Bauers-
Toy v. Clarence Central School District.147 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See Hall v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 995 F. Supp. 1001, 1005–06 (E.D. Mo. 
1998) (recognizing a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII). 
 141 See Block-Victor v. CITG Promotions, LLC, 665 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808, 808 n.2 (E.D. 
Mich. 2009) (recognizing as valid “sex plus age” discrimination claims under Title VII, but noting 
that “[c]ourts have rejected ‘age plus’ theories of discrimination under the ADEA” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 142 See, e.g., Dominguez v. FS1 L.A., LLC, No. CV 15-09683-RSWL-AJWx, 2016 WL 
2885861, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016) (recognizing that “although courts have rejected ‘age-
plus’ claims under the ADEA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had recognized a ‘sex-plus’ 
theory of discrimination, such that a plaintiff’s combination claim “is adequately pled as a ‘sex-
plus-age’ claim under Title VII, even if the claim is not cognizable under the ADEA” (citations 
omitted)). 
 143 See, e.g., Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *5–8 (rejecting a sex-plus-age claim under 
Title VII and an age-plus-sex claim under the ADEA). 
 144 See, e.g., Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 98-4035, 1999 WL 701911, at *1, *5 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 1, 1999) (declining to decide whether a cause of action for “sex plus age discrimination” 
exists); Famighette v. Rose, 2:17-cv-2553(DRH)(ARL), 2018 WL 2048371, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 
2, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination and gender-plus-age discrimina-
tion under Title VII because plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege “facts suggesting an inference of 
[even gender] discrimination”). 
 145 See, e.g., Poteat v. PSC Auto. Grp., Inc., No. 3:03CV129, 2006 WL 2828836, at *2 
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (recognizing that plaintiff had asserted a Title VII claim “under the 
theory of either ‘sex’ or ‘sex plus’ discrimination,” but granting summary judgment to defendant 
in part because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of discrimination); Best v. GTE Di-
rectories Serv. Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:92-CV-0163, 1993 WL 13144123, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
8, 1993) (assuming, after a bench trial on plaintiff’s Title VII claims, that the plaintiff had estab-
lished prima facie cases of sex discrimination and sex-plus-age discrimination, but ultimately 
rejecting both claims). 
 146 See, e.g., Best v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CV-00086-NBB, 2018 WL 4145921, at *1–3 (N.D. 
Miss. Aug. 30, 2018); Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6–7. 
 147 See 2015 WL 13574291, at *6–7. 
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In Bauers-Toy, plaintiff Katherine Bauers-Toy claimed she was dis-
criminated against by her employer, the Clarence Central School District, 
due to her age and gender given her status as the oldest female teacher in 
the science department.148 Only days before trial, the school district filed a 
motion in limine arguing that Bauers-Toy could not combine age and gen-
der, but instead must present separate discrimination claims.149 The school 
district argued that because Title VII, which governs gender discrimination, 
and the ADEA, which prohibits age discrimination, contain different proof 
requirements, proceeding on either an “age plus gender” or “gender plus 
age” claim of discrimination would be “improper.”150 In response, Bauers-
Toy argued that she should be allowed to present a combined claim of sex 
and age discrimination to highlight evidence that younger women within the 
broader class of female employees were treated more favorably.151 
Agreeing with the school district, the court ruled that Bauers-Toy 
would be required to submit her age-based and sex-based claims separately, 
as alternative bases for recovery.152 Given the timing of the court’s opin-
ion—which it issued “on the eve of trial”—the court framed the issue as 
“how plaintiff’s evidence, which involves two different protected classifica-
tions governed by two distinct statutes with separate standards, may proper-
ly be presented to the jury.”153 The court thus considered “whether a ‘gender 
plus age’ claim is permissible under Title VII and whether an ‘age plus gen-
der’ claim is permissible under the ADEA.”154 
With respect to the Title VII claim, the court acknowledged that many 
of the sex-plus cases summarized above—including Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free School District,155 McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School,156 
and Feingold v. New York157—“appear[] to be consistent with plaintiff’s 
argument that she is permitted to present a ‘gender plus’ claim under Title 
VII.”158 Nevertheless, the court distinguished those cases given that “the 
vast majority” of them involved a plus factor consisting of either another 
Title VII protected characteristic, such as race or religion, or some other 
“characteristic found to be directly related to gender stereotypes such as 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. at *1. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at *5. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
 158 Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *5. 
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those attributed to working mothers.”159 Thus, the court explained, “the dis-
tinguishing factor between the Back line of cases and this case is that age is 
neither a protected characteristic under Title VII nor is it related to certain 
gender-based stereotypes such as . . . motherhood.”160 
Next, the court examined the distinct proof requirements of Title VII, 
which permits claims based on a mixed-motive,161 and the ADEA, which 
does not.162 With this distinction in mind, the court reasoned that “allowing 
plaintiff to argue to the jury that the defendant violated Title VII by discrim-
inating against her on the basis of sex and age would be contrary to the pur-
pose and requirements of the ADEA.”163 Citing Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., which declared that the ADEA does not allow “a plaintiff [to] 
establish [age] discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating 
factor,”164 the court explained: 
Allowing plaintiff here to present evidence of age discrimination 
under the auspices of her Title VII gender discrimination claim, 
which is subject to a more lenient [motivating factor] standard, 
would be tantamount to allowing plaintiff to argue age discrimi-
nation in the context of a mixed-motive theory of discrimination. 
Such a result stands in direct opposition to the language of the 
ADEA and the Supreme Court’s holding in Gross. In addition, it 
would provide plaintiffs an end-run around the heightened stand-
ards set forth by Congress under the ADEA. Indeed, any employ-
ee who believes they are a victim of age discrimination and falls 
under a category protected by Title VII would be better served by 
filing a Title VII mixed-motive theory of discrimination, rather 
than a claim under the ADEA, and arguing that the Title VII fac-
tor plus age was the basis for the discriminatory conduct. Such a 
result could not have been the intent of Congress.165 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 53 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting an em-
ployer’s argument in a sex-plus case that a plaintiff must prove the discrimination would not have 
occurred but for her gender because “Title VII requires no such proof”; rather, Title VII “bars 
discrimination when sex is ‘a motivating factor,’ not ‘the motivating factor’” (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m))). 
 162 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Our inquiry therefore must 
focus on the text of the ADEA to decide whether it authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination 
claim. It does not.”). 
 163 Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6. 
 164 Id. (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 167). 
 165 Id. (citation omitted).  
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Accordingly, the court concluded that Bauers-Toy could not argue that her 
alleged Title VII injuries were motivated by both her gender and her age; 
rather, “[a]s to her Title VII claim, she must exclusively argue gender dis-
crimination.”166 
2. Courts Authorizing Title VII Sex-Plus-Age Discrimination Claims 
Unlike Bauers-Toy, numerous courts have authorized sex-plus-age 
claims as part of the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination.167 Two 
decisions authored by Judge Lowell E. Reed, Jr., of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—decided just one year 
apart—are particularly significant because Judge Reed first permitted one 
plaintiff to combine sex with age under Title VII,168 but later rejected the 
age-plus theory under the ADEA as to the second plaintiff.169 
In the first case, Arnett v. Aspin, decided in 1994, Judge Reed recog-
nized a subgroup of women over age forty under Title VII, along the way 
rejecting the defendant’s argument that it would be improper to combine a 
classification protected by Title VII with one protected by another statute.170 
In that case, plaintiff Mary Arnett alleged that she was discriminated against 
by her employer because she was a female over the age of forty.171 To sup-
port her claim, Arnett presented evidence that two women under thirty were 
hired over her for the position of equal employment specialist, and that all 
of her employer’s equal employment specialists had been women under for-
ty or men over forty.172 The Arnett defendant then moved for summary 
judgment with respect to Arnett’s Title VII sex-plus-age claim, but Judge 
Reed rejected the motion.173 Judge Reed explained: 
The point behind the establishment of the sex-plus discrimination 
theory is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary judg-
ment when the defendant employer does not discriminate against 
all members of the sex. . . . As the Court stated in Jefferies, an 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Id. at *7. 
 167 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. 
 168 Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 169 Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to protection under the subclass of “age-plus-disability”). 
 170 846 F. Supp. at 1240–41. The defendant’s argument rejected by Judge Reed mirrored the 
defendant’s argument that was accepted in Bauers-Toy. See 2015 WL 13574291, at *1. 
 171 Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See id. at 1237 (explaining that the defendants only sought summary judgment in their 
favor with respect to the second count of Arnett’s complaint, which alleged sex-plus-age discrimi-
nation under Title VII); see also id. at 1240 (rejecting defendants’ motion for summary judgment). 
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employer could discriminate against a discrete group of women—
large women, black women, women with children, married wom-
en, pregnant women, older women—and be granted summary 
judgment in their favor because they had indeed filled these posi-
tions with other women not in the group. Such a result cannot be 
condoned. This is true whether or not the “plus” classification is 
also one afforded protection on its own, such as age under the 
ADEA.174 
In reaching this result, Judge Reed further noted that “the current line 
drawn between viable and nonviable sex-plus claims is adequate—that the 
‘plus’ classification be based on either an immutable characteristic or the 
exercise of a fundamental right.”175 And, because age is an immutable char-
acteristic, the sex-plus theory of discrimination applies to the “discrete sub-
class of ‘women over forty.’”176 On the merits, Judge Reed thus found that 
Arnett, a woman over forty, had shown a prima facie case of discrimination 
because: (1) she was a member of the protected “women over forty” sub-
class; (2) “she was qualified for and applied for the positions in question”; 
(3) though qualified, “she was denied the positions”; and (4) “other em-
ployees outside her protected class were selected, in this case two women 
under 40.”177 
Despite recognizing a combined sex-plus-age claim in Arnett, Judge 
Reed was careful to clarify that Arnett’s claim arose under Title VII, rather 
than the ADEA.178 Just one year later, in Kelly v. Drexel University, Judge 
Reed rejected an age-plus-disability theory of discrimination under the 
ADEA, ruling that the “plaintiff [was] not entitled to protection as a mem-
ber of a subclass of older workers with disabilities.”179 Since then, numer-
ous courts have likewise considered age-plus claims under the ADEA. 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. at 1240. 
 175 Id. at 1241. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 1240 (noting that “[i]t is important to remember that the second count of Arnett’s 
complaint contains a claim for sex discrimination, not age discrimination”); see also id. (stating 
that “Arnett claims the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of 
Title VII because they required more of her than they did of male applicants for the position for 
which she applied,” namely, that she be under the age of forty). 
 179 907 F. Supp. at 875 n.8. 
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IV. AGE-PLUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA 
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not considered whether 
age-plus discrimination claims are valid under the ADEA,180 and lower 
courts are split on the issue.181 This Part examines these competing opin-
ions, with a particular focus on the arguments for and against such claims. 
Section A of this Part examines how a majority of courts have found age-
plus discrimination claims under the ADEA invalid.182 Section B then ex-
amines how a minority of courts have authorized age-plus discrimination 
claims under the ADEA.183 
A. The Majority View: Age-Plus Discrimination Claims Are Invalid 
At least eight federal district courts have rejected attempts to claim 
age-plus discrimination under the ADEA.184 
Perhaps the most common reason for rejecting ADEA age-plus dis-
crimination claims pertains to the differing proof requirements between Ti-
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-4132-JFA-PJG, 2010 WL 1052082, at 
*4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010) (noting that “no Supreme Court opinion . . . appears to have explicitly 
addressed the propriety of an age plus suit brought under the ADEA”); see also Fuller v. Meredith 
Corp., No. 17-2335-JWL, 2018 WL 3973147, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2018) (noting that the Su-
preme Court has never permitted “age-plus-gender” claims under the ADEA, but also denying the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue because “[w]hether or not gender was also 
a motivating factor, to succeed on this claim plaintiff will be required at trial to show that age was 
the determining factor”). 
 181 See infra notes 184–225 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 184–208 and accompanying text. 
 183 See infra notes 209–225 and accompanying text. 
 184 See Famighette v. Rose, No. 2:17-cv-2553(DRH)(ARL), 2018 WL 2048371, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s age-plus-gender discrimination claim under the 
ADEA); Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291, at *7–8 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s age-plus-gender theory of discrimination under 
the ADEA); Thompson v. City of Columbus, No. 2:12-cv-01054, 2014 WL 1814069, at *10 (S.D. 
Ohio May 7, 2014) (finding that “age-plus-sex claims under the ADEA do not exist”); Johnson v. 
Napolitano, No. 10 Civ. 8545(ALC), 2013 WL 1285164, at *8–10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (de-
clining to recognize a purported subclass of employees “based on the combined factors of race, 
gender, color and age”); Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–4 (rejecting the argument that the law 
allows age-plus-gender claims under the ADEA); McKinney v. City of Hawthorne, No. CV08-07-
GW(Ex), 2008 WL 11338236, at *1 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to 
argue age-plus-sex discrimination under the ADEA); Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. 
Cal.), aff’d, 167 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that “there does not exist in the law theories 
of ‘age-plus-religion’ or ‘age-plus-disability’ discrimination under the ADEA”); Kelly v. Drexel 
Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting an age-plus-disability theory of dis-
crimination under the ADEA while granting summary judgment to the defendant); see also Smith 
v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cty., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187 (D. Kan. 2000) (declaring that 
“[n]o district court has explicitly adopted an age-plus-gender theory of liability under the ADEA,” 
and rejecting plaintiff’s age-plus-gender claim—assuming one exists—due to insufficient evi-
dence). 
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tle VII and ADEA claims.185 Here, courts have reasoned that a Title VII 
claim may be proven with evidence that the Title VII discriminatory factor, 
such as the plaintiff’s sex, was just one motivating factor for the employer’s 
actions.186 An ADEA claim, by contrast, requires proof that age was the sole 
motivating cause of the employer’s action.187 This distinction between Title 
VII and the ADEA is seemingly intentional, given that Congress amended 
Title VII to permit so-called mixed-motive claims (i.e., one involving both 
lawful and unlawful motives),188 but did not amend the ADEA to include 
similar language despite having amended the ADEA in other ways around 
the same time.189 
As previously noted, in Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Central School Dis-
trict, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York 
precluded Title VII sex-plus-age claims because permitting such claims 
“would be tantamount to allowing plaintiff to argue age discrimination in 
the context of a mixed-motive theory of discrimination,” contravening the 
ADEA’s text, Congressional intent, and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc.190 Having reached this result with respect to the plaintiff’s Title VII 
sex-plus-age claim, it is no surprise that the court reached the same result 
with respect to the plaintiff’s age-plus-sex claim under the ADEA.191 Again, 
the court emphasized that because an ADEA plaintiff must prove that her 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See, e.g., Famighette, 2018 WL 2048371, at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s age-plus-gender 
discrimination claim upon finding that courts in the Second Circuit have not entertained mixed-
motive cases for age discrimination in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Gross v. FBL Fi-
nancial Services, Inc., which held that “a plaintiff must prove . . . age was the ‘but-for’ cause of 
the challenged adverse employment action” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Bau-
ers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *7–8; Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–4 (declaring that “the 
court . . . lacks the authority to recognize an age plus claim under the ADEA”). 
 186 See, e.g., Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–4. The 1991 amendments to Title VII instruct 
that an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, such as the creation of a hostile work envi-
ronment, is proven when “the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 
F.3d 32, 53 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting an employer’s argument in a sex-plus case that a plaintiff 
must prove the discrimination would not have occurred but for her gender because “Title VII 
requires no such proof[]” but rather that Title VII “bars discrimination when sex is ‘a motivating 
factor,’ not ‘the motivating factor’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m))). 
 187 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“Unlike Title VII, the 
ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age 
was simply a motivating factor.”); see also Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–4. 
 188 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 189 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (“Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a [mixed-motive] 
provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), 
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways . . . .”). 
 190 Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6. 
 191 Id. at *8. 
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age was the but-for cause of the discriminatory conduct, it would be “logi-
cally inconsistent” for a plaintiff to argue that her age was the but-for cause 
of the harm she incurred at the hands of her employer, “and also that [her 
employer] took that action on the basis of her gender.”192 As the court ex-
plained, “any evidence that the discriminatory conduct was motivated by 
plaintiff’s gender would tend to disprove an age claim under the ADEA and 
would certainly lead to confusion for the jury.”193 Accordingly, as to her 
ADEA claim, the court ruled that Bauers-Toy “must exclusively argue age 
discrimination.”194 In closing, the Bauers-Toy court declared: 
[T]he Court finds that it cannot reconcile plaintiff’s claim that she 
was discriminated against on the basis of both her age and gender 
with the separate statutory schemes set forth under Title VII and 
the ADEA, as well as the findings that the jury must make to de-
termine that defendant violated either statute. Simply put, while 
the Court understands plaintiff’s argument that she was discrimi-
nated against based upon the combined characteristics of gender 
and age, it does not appear that, absent a change in the law . . . 
she can appropriately combine those arguments in one claim [un-
der] Title VII or the ADEA.195 
Like Bauers-Toy, numerous federal courts have invoked Gross to pre-
clude age-plus claims under the ADEA.196 In Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Asso-
ciates, Inc., for example, the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina rejected age-plus-sex claims under the ADEA,197 reasoning 
that “Gross appears to prohibit claims asserting ‘an intersection of motives’ 
brought pursuant to the ADEA, as only the age motive truly matters.”198 
Aside from invoking the ADEA’s general prohibition of mixed-motive 
claims, courts have rejected ADEA age-plus discrimination claims on the 
basis  that authorizing them would amount to “judicial legislation,” a view 
expressed in 2013 by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
                                                                                                                           
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See, e.g., Famighette, 2018 WL 2048371, at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s age-plus-gender 
discrimination claim in light of Gross); Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–5 (rejecting age-plus-
gender claims under the ADEA in light of Gross). 
 197 Cartee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *3–5. 
 198 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). But see id. (noting that “Gross addressed the burden of persua-
sion at trial, and several courts to have considered Gross have questioned the appropriate breadth 
of its application beyond that context,” such as in the case of “a judgment on the pleadings”). 
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trict of New York in Johnson v. Napolitano,199 and by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California in 1996 in Luce v. Dalton.200  
In Luce, the plaintiff, a terminated employee, moved to amend his 
complaint against his former employer to claim “that he was wrongfully 
terminated because of his age, because of his age plus his religion, because 
of his age plus being a non-Mormon, and/or because of his age plus his 
hearing disability.”201 Rejecting plaintiff’s motion, the court recognized that 
there is no super-statute to handle every federally protected classification—
race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability—and Congress 
could have so amended Title VII if that was its intention.202 Rather, the 
court observed, “Congress chose to pass entirely separate legislation, 
providing for an entirely different basis for relief to persons who believe 
they have been discriminated against in employment based upon their age 
or disability.”203 Accordingly, the court felt that “allow[ing] [p]laintiff here to 
aggregate claims under four completely different statutes, as an extension of 
‘sex-plus’ theories of discrimination, would amount to judicial legislation.”204 
Along with a strict interpretation of Gross’s “but-for” causation re-
quirement and judicial legislation concerns,205 at least seven federal courts 
rejecting age-plus discrimination claims have cited the apparent lack of case 
law to support such claims (perhaps erroneously, as the next Part shows).206 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See 2013 WL 1285164, at *9 (rejecting the age-plus theory of discrimination in a case 
involving the combined factors of race, gender, color and age, in part because “no court has cob-
bled together so many protected characteristics as a viable subgroup,” and recognizing such a 
subgroup would amount to “judicial legislation”). 
 200 See 166 F.R.D. at 461 (rejecting the age-plus theory of discrimination in part because 
allowing a plaintiff “to aggregate claims under four completely different statutes, as an extension 
of ‘sex-plus’ theories of discrimination, would amount to judicial legislation”); cf. Bauers-Toy, 
2015 WL 13574291, at *6 (“Even if this Court were to connect plaintiff’s age with some type of 
gender-based stereotype . . . the fact remains that the two protected classes at issue here are gov-
erned by their own statutes with wholly separate standards and remedies. . . . The Court finds this 
indicative of a Congressional intent that age discrimination not be addressed within the context of 
a Title VII claim.”). 
 201 Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 458. 
 202 See id. at 461. 
 203 Id. Age discrimination is prohibited by the ADEA. See Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). Disability discrimination is prohibited by the 
ADA, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012), and, for certain 
employees, by the Rehabilitation Act § 504, Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)). 
 204 Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461. 
 205 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77. 
 206 See, e.g., Famighette, 2018 WL 2048371, at *5 (rejecting age-plus discrimination claims 
in part because “[c]ourts in the Second Circuit have not entertained mixed-motive cases for age 
discrimination”); Thompson, 2014 WL 1814069, at *10 (rejecting age-plus-sex claim under the 
ADEA based on cases “almost unanimously conclud[ing] that age-plus claims under the ADEA 
do not exist”); Johnson, 2013 WL 1285164, at *8 (noting that “[e]ven where the courts have rec-
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In McKinney v. City of Hawthorne, for example, the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California in 2008 recognized that although 
courts in the Ninth Circuit had authorized sex-plus claims under Title VII, 
one district court within the Ninth Circuit had “persuasively rejected any 
‘age-plus’ claims under the ADEA.”207 Accordingly, as to the plaintiff’s 
age-based discrimination claim, the court limited its analysis to whether the 
plaintiff could “demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to . . . age alone.”208 
B. The Minority View: Age-Plus Discrimination Claims Are Valid 
At least five federal courts have authorized age-plus discrimination 
claims under the ADEA.209 Other courts have recognized a combined sex 
and age discrimination claim without clearly specifying whether the claim 
                                                                                                                           
ognized two factors, courts have not included age in a protected-factor-plus consideration”); Car-
tee, 2010 WL 1052082, at *4 (rejecting age-plus-gender claims under the ADEA, and recognizing 
that although plus claims have been recognized under Title VII, “no United States Supreme Court 
opinion nor any published Fourth Circuit opinion appears to have explicitly addressed the proprie-
ty of an age plus suit brought under the ADEA,” and “courts that have addressed the question have 
expressly declined to extend plus claims to the ADEA”); Block-Victor v. CITG Promotions, LLC, 
665 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that “[c]ourts have rejected ‘age plus’ 
theories of discrimination under the ADEA”); McKinney, 2008 WL 11338236, at *1 n.2 (rejecting 
plaintiff’s attempt to argue age-plus-sex discrimination under the ADEA because “at least one 
court within th[e Ninth] Circuit has persuasively rejected any ‘age-plus’ claims under the 
ADEA”); Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461 (finding “no recognizable citation to any case authority [in the 
materials provided by the plaintiff] which would support the assertion that there exists a viable 
‘age-plus’ theory of employment discrimination”). 
 207 McKinney, 2008 WL 11338236, at *1 n.2 (citing Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459–61). Notably, 
the court reached this result despite recognizing that at least one court within the Ninth Circuit had 
indeed authorized age-plus claims. See id. (citing Good v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 93-302-
FR, 1995 WL 67672, at *1–2 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 1995), as an example of a case permitting a discrim-
ination claim combining age and sex). 
 208 Id. at *1 n.2. 
 209 See, e.g., Glover v. Donahoe, No. 3:12cv189 (JBA), 2013 WL 6183891, at *3 (D. Conn. 
Nov. 25, 2013) (recognizing that at summary judgment “a plaintiff is permitted to advance an 
‘age-plus’ argument”); Fratturo v. Gartner, Inc., No. 3:11cv113 (JBA), 2013 WL 160375, at *6–8 
(D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2013) (rejecting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s ADEA 
age-plus-disability claim); Siegel v. Inverness Med. Innovations, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1791, 2009 
WL 3756709, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2009) (denying summary judgment to the defendant on 
the plaintiff’s age-plus-gender or gender-plus-age claim of discrimination, and “grant[ing] [the 
plaintiff] leave to amend her complaint to bring her ‘age plus’ claim under the ADEA”); cf. Leal 
v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting an employer’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s age discrimination claim and agreeing with the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Gross 
in which it rejected the employer’s argument that “age must have been the only factor in the em-
ployer’s decision-making process” (internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. DynMcDermott 
Petroleum Operations Co., 537 F. App’x 437, 448 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (reversing a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer in suit alleging both age and disability 
as bases for the employer’s adverse employment action). 
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is cognizable under Title VII or the ADEA,210 and still other courts have 
refused to decide the issue where such a decision was unnecessary.211 
Courts authorizing ADEA age-plus discrimination claims have high-
lighted the obvious analogy to sex-plus discrimination claims, including 
sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.212 In one such case, a female plaintiff 
alleged that her employer terminated her employment while “retain[ing] 
male and younger female employees with poorer performance evaluations 
and less experience.”213 Denying summary judgment to the defendant on 
the plaintiff’s age-plus-gender and gender-plus-age discrimination claims, 
the court reasoned that because the well-established sex-plus doctrine 
would naturally encompass a sex-plus-age claim, there is no reason age-
plus-gender claims should not be actionable as well214 (even though the 
court determined that such claims should be brought under the ADEA, ra-
ther than under Title VII).215 
Courts validating age-plus discrimination claims under the ADEA have 
also read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gross less restrictively than those 
rejecting such claims, such that age need not be the only motivating fac-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See, e.g., Good, 1995 WL 67672, at *1–2 (recognizing combined claim of age and sex 
discrimination without specifying whether claim is cognizable under Title VII or the ADEA); see 
also EEOC v. BOK Fin. Corp., No. CIV 11-1132 RB/LFG, 2013 WL 12042699, at *3–5 (D.N.M. 
Sept. 18, 2013) (rejecting summary judgment to a defendant-employer on the plaintiffs’ age-plus-
gender claims alleging discrimination against women over age 40); Plaintiff EEOC’s First 
Amended Complaint & Jury Trial Demand ¶ 19, BOK Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 12042699 (D.N.M. 
Sept. 18, 2013) (No. CIV 11-1132 RB/LFG), 2013 WL 8563207 (alleging age-plus-sex discrimi-
nation against the plaintiffs “in violation of both the ADEA and Title VII . . . because they are 
women over 40 years of age”). 
 211 See, e.g., Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding 
“no need . . . to create an age-plus-sex claim independent from [the plaintiff’s] viable ADEA 
claim” because “[e]ven if some subset of employees protected by the ADEA were not subject to 
age-based discrimination, [the plaintiff] may still have encountered such discrimination”); Smith 
v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that “[t]he status of the 
‘sex plus age’ and ‘age plus sex’ claims is unclear,” but stating that “defendants have not chal-
lenged the ‘sex plus’ or ‘age plus’ formulations in this motion, so the issue need not be addressed 
at this time”); Smith, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (rejecting plaintiff’s age-plus-gender discrimination 
claim because “[e]ven if [an age-plus-gender] claim is cognizable under the ADEA, plaintiff has 
failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in her favor”); see also Aiello v. 
Stamford Hosp., 487 F. App’x 677, 678 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff “failed to develop 
[his age-plus-gender argument] in any meaningful way in the District Court . . . and therefore he 
has waived any reliance on that theory on appeal” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 212 See, e.g., Siegel, 2009 WL 3756709, at *1–2 (discussing age-plus and sex-plus claims 
under Title VII and the ADEA, and ultimately granting leave for the plaintiff “to amend her com-
plaint to bring her ‘age plus’ claim under the ADEA”). 
 213 Id. at *1. 
 214 See id. at *2 (“Inverness offers no reason why ‘age plus’ claims should not be cognizable 
even if ‘gender plus’ claims are.”). 
 215 Id. (granting plaintiff “leave to amend her complaint to bring her ‘age plus’ claim under 
the ADEA,” rather than Title VII). 
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tor.216 For example, in 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that Gross’s requirement of “but-for 
causation” demands proof that an “employer was motivated solely by age 
when making an adverse employment decision.”217 According to the Tenth 
Circuit, Gross “does not . . . plac[e] a heightened evidentiary requirement 
on ADEA plaintiffs to prove that age was the sole cause of the adverse em-
ployment action.”218 Rather, the ADEA may be violated “if other factors 
contributed” to the employer’s adverse action, as long as “age was the fac-
tor that made a difference.”219  
Adopting a similar standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in 2013 explained that Gross’s “but-for cause” requirement can 
be satisfied even where age was not the “sole cause” of the plaintiffs’ injury, 
such that plaintiffs “need not plead that age was the sole cause of their inju-
ry to survive a motion to dismiss.”220 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has adopted a similar interpretation, holding that age does not need be the 
“sole cause” of the plaintiff’s injury, as long as evidence shows that age was 
“the determinative factor in th[e] [employer’s] decision.”221 
Finally, in a case alleging discrimination on the basis of age-plus-
disability, Fratturo v. Gartner, Inc., the United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut in 2013 recognized an age-plus claim despite ac-
knowledging Gross’s requirement of proving “that age was the ‘but-for’ 
cause of the challenged adverse employment action and not just a contrib-
uting or motivating factor.”222 Despite this articulation of Gross, the Frat-
turo court declared that “a plaintiff is permitted to advance an ‘age-plus’ 
argument, to claim that she was discriminated against based on her mem-
bership in two protected classes,”223 thereby authorizing plaintiff’s claim of 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277–78 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 217 Id. at 1277. 
 218 Id. at 1278. 
 219 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 220 See Leal, 731 F.3d at 415 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221 See Arthur v. Pet Dairy, 593 F. App’x 211, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[P]ursuant to Gross, 
for an event to be the ‘but-for cause,’ it need not be the sole cause of the adverse employment 
action. . . . [Rather], [w]hen evaluating cases like this on summary judgment, our focus is on 
whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the employer’s stated 
reasons for the employment action, such that a reasonable juror may find age was the determina-
tive factor in that decision.”). 
 222 Fratturo, 2013 WL 160375, at *6 (quoting Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 223 Id. (citing Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 109). 
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discrimination “based on her age plus her disability.”224 In the summary 
judgment context, other courts have reached similar results.225 
V. PROPOSALS 
Broadly speaking, this Article seeks to determine whether subgroup dis-
crimination claims combining age with some other characteristic should be 
recognized as valid, both under Title VII and under the ADEA. Because dis-
crimination against older females is the most likely type of subgroup discrim-
ination claim to arise where age discrimination is at play,226 section A of this 
Part first addresses the viability of such a claim under Title VII.227 After con-
cluding that such claims are indeed valid, section B then considers whether 
courts should recognize plus discrimination claims under the ADEA.228 
A. Title VII Sex-Plus Discrimination Against Older  
Females or Older Males 
Before considering the broader question of whether the sex-plus dis-
crimination doctrine should be extended to the ADEA, it is helpful to first 
examine the particular age-plus claim most likely to arise: discrimination 
against a subgroup of older females or older males. This issue is unique be-
cause it pits well-established United States Supreme Court sex-plus dis-
crimination precedents, including Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,229 
against the Court’s ADEA precedents, including Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc.230 As this section shows, the sex-plus discrimination case law 
and the ADEA case law become difficult to reconcile when applied to dis-
crimination claims combining age with another protected characteristic. 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that sex-plus-age dis-
crimination claims under Title VII are, from a factual standpoint, no differ-
ent than age-plus-sex claims under the ADEA. As Bauers-Toy v. Clarence 
                                                                                                                           
 224 Id. at *8. 
 225 See, e.g., Glover, 2013 WL 6183891, at *3 (stating, at summary judgment, that “a plaintiff 
is permitted to advance an ‘age-plus’ argument, to claim that he was discriminated against based 
on his membership in two protected classes”); BOK Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 12040730, at *4–5 
(denying summary judgment to the defendant-employer in a case where the plaintiff alleged age-
plus-gender discrimination due in part to sufficient evidence that the employer “discriminated 
against [the plaintiff] based on her age, sex, and age plus sex,” and noting that the plaintiff had 
demonstrated “a triable issue as to whether her age was a ‘but for’ cause of her termination for 
purposes of the ADEA” (emphasis added)). 
 226 See generally Porter, supra note 86. 
 227 See infra notes 229–252 and accompanying text. 
 228 See infra notes 253–341 and accompanying text. 
 229 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 230 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
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Central School District reveals, the two claims are functionally identical in 
that they involve alleged discrimination against ADEA-protected male or 
female employees.231 And, as Part IV demonstrates, there are two ways to 
view such claims.232 On the one hand, if age-plus-sex claims under the 
ADEA are precluded by Gross’s conception of but-for causation—under 
which an ADEA plaintiff must prove that age was “the reason”233 for the 
adverse employment action as opposed to “simply a motivating factor”234—
then sex-plus-age discrimination claims under Title VII also should be pre-
cluded because permitting such claims would allow a plaintiff to prevail 
upon a showing of two discriminatory motives, thereby circumventing the 
causation principles espoused in Gross.235 On the other hand, if the Title VII 
sex-plus doctrine is applied faithfully, then sex-plus-age claims should be 
permitted, given that the well-established sex-plus doctrine, flowing from 
Phillips, permits such claims when an employer discriminates against a 
subgroup of male or female employees on the basis of an immutable charac-
teristic, which would naturally encompass a person’s age.236 
The most logical way to resolve the conflict between Gross, on the one 
hand, and Phillips, on the other, is to focus narrowly on the precise issue 
addressed in this section, i.e., whether Title VII permits sex-plus-age dis-
crimination claims, rather than whether an analogous claim could pass mus-
ter under the ADEA. In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs often 
bring overlapping claims under different statutes; yet, absent some specific 
rule of law directing them to do so, courts ordinarily do not interpret one 
statute (here, Title VII) by pretending they are interpreting another (the 
ADEA).237 Accordingly, with respect to sex-plus-age claims, the question is 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See supra notes 147–154 and accompanying text; see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012) 
(limiting the ADEA’s protection to employees at least forty years of age). 
 232 See supra notes 180–225 and accompanying text. 
 233 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (declaring that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s re-
quirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that 
the employer decided to act”). 
 234 See id. at 174 (“Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may 
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.”). 
 235 See Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 236 See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 237 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173 (“Petitioner relies on this Court’s decisions construing Title 
VII for his interpretation of the ADEA. Because Title VII is materially different with respect to 
the relevant burden of persuasion, however, these decisions do not control our construction of the 
ADEA.”); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008) (cautioning in an ADEA 
claim that “employees and their counsel must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination”); Lewis v. Humboldt Acqui-
sition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Just as we erred by reading the ‘solely’ 
language from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA based on the shared purposes and histories of 
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not whether the ADEA would allow such claims, and consequently whether 
Title VII should likewise permit them, but rather whether Title VII, in and 
of itself, allows such claims. When the question is framed this way, the an-
swer must be yes. 
The sex-plus discrimination doctrine has a nearly fifty year history, da-
ting back at least as far as the Court’s decision in Phillips.238 Under today’s 
sex-plus doctrine, a plaintiff, often female, may prevail on a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim if she can prove her employer discriminated against 
her because of the combination of her gender plus some additional factor 
pertaining either to an immutable characteristic or the exercise of a funda-
mental right.239 Because age is an immutable characteristic, Phillips and its 
progeny compel the conclusion that sex-plus-age claims are valid under Ti-
tle VII.240  
There is good reason for this protection. After all, without the sex-plus 
doctrine, an employer could discriminate against a particular subgroup of 
women, such as “large women, black women, women with children, mar-
ried women, pregnant women, or older women,” and avoid liability for sex 
discrimination based on how it treated other women outside of that particu-
lar subgroup.241 As the Court’s decision in Phillips reflects, such a result is 
untenable because Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be 
given employment opportunities irrespective of sex.”242 Moreover, this re-
sult should not change simply because the “plus” factor involves an immu-
table characteristic protected by another statute, “such as age under the 
ADEA.”243 
Although numerous scholars have addressed the unique discriminatory 
treatment of older female employees,244 the argument that Title VII should 
extend to sex-plus-age discrimination claims is perhaps best articulated by 
                                                                                                                           
the two laws . . . so we would err by reading the ‘motivating factor’ language from Title VII into 
the ADA. Shared statutory purposes do not invariably lead to shared statutory texts, and in the end 
it is the text that matters.”). 
 238 400 U.S. at 543–44; see also id. at 544–47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 239 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 240 See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 241 Id.; see also Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032–33. 
 242 See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544; see also supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 243 See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 244 See, e.g., Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchor-
women on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 197 (1985) (arguing, 
based on the rule that sex plus an immutable characteristic should result in a legally permissible 
basis for a prima facie case of sex discrimination, that age-related appearance is an immutable 
characteristic akin to “race and physical stature”); Leslie S. Gielow, Note, Sex Discrimination in 
Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REV. 443, 443–45 (1985) (arguing that sex-plus discrimination is preva-
lent against older women in newscasting). 
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Professor Nicole Buonocore Porter in her article, Sex Plus Age Discrimina-
tion: Protecting Older Women Workers.245 Professor Porter argues that sex-
plus-age discrimination claims should be recognized to the same extent as 
sex-plus-race cases, given that “older women are treated differently . . . than 
older men and younger women,” including in employment.246 In her article, 
Professor Porter demonstrates that the biases, prejudices, and stereotypes 
associated with both “ageism” and “sexism” become worse when coupled 
together,247 becoming for some women a “double hurdle of sex discrimina-
tion and age bias.”248 Professor Porter shows, for example, that older wom-
en do not fare as well in the workforce as compared to both older men and 
younger women in matters such as pay and promotion,249 given that older 
men are generally treated more favorably as they age, whereas employers 
often value women for their youthfulness and physical appearance.250 
Professor Porter is not alone in these observations. In one recent study, 
for example, economics professors David Neumark and Patrick Button, along 
with researcher Ian Burn, examined evidence from over 40,000 job applica-
tions and found “robust evidence of age discrimination in hiring against older 
women, especially those near retirement age,” with “less robust” results for 
aging men.251 And, as another commentator has noted based on her review of 
the relevant literature, “a steadily increasing body of discourse has considered 
and found support for the proposition that older women face employment and 
societal discrimination that is separate and distinct from that of older men and 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See generally Porter, supra note 86. 
 246 Id. at 80. 
 247 Id. at 94–101. 
 248 Id. at 98 (quoting ROBERT S. MENCHIN, NEW WORK OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLDER AMER-
ICANS 240 (1993)). 
 249 Id. at 97–98, 101 (citing Darlene Stevens, Age Old Problem: Job Gains Made by Young 
Don’t Translate to Later Years, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1991, at F12) (reporting that in the early 
1990s, “women over 45 earn[ed] an average of less than sixty percent of salaries paid to men the 
same age”); see also Carol Moseley-Braun, Women’s Retirement Security, 4 ELDER L.J. 493, 494 
(1996) (noting that, “[o]ver a lifetime, women earn roughly fifty-eight percent of a man’s income” 
(citing Bonnie Thornton Dill, Race & Gender in Occupational Segregation, in PAY EQUITY: AN 
ISSUE OF RACE, ETHNICITY & SEX 11, 63 (Nat’l Comm. on Pay Equity ed., 1987)). 
 250 Porter, supra note 86, at 94; see also Bonnie Marcus, Age Discrimination and Women in 
the Workplace: How to Avoid Getting Pushed Out, FORBES (May 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/bonniemarcus/2018/05/12/age-discrimination-and-women-in-the-workplace-heres-how-
to-avoid-getting-pushed-out/#19ccd812c4a4 [https://perma.cc/4XKZ-YEQP] (reporting that older 
women employees are often “marginalized, and pushed out to make way for younger employees,” 
and noting that “[a]ge related assumptions create the [false] perception that older workers, espe-
cially women, lack the stamina, aren’t technically savvy, and want to slow down; they aren’t in-
vested in their careers”). 
 251 David Neumark et al., Is It Harder for Older Workers to Find Jobs? New and Improved 
Evidence from a Field Experiment 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21669, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21669.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3W6-LZSC]. 
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younger women.”252 Accordingly, given the obvious application of sex-plus 
discrimination doctrine to the sex-plus-age context, as well as the potential 
for discrimination against older women in particular, Title VII should be read 
to authorize sex-plus-age discrimination claims. 
B. Extending the Title VII Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to the ADEA 
Once it is determined that the sex-plus discrimination doctrine should 
apply to Title VII sex-plus-age claims, one might infer that age-plus-sex 
claims should likewise be valid under the ADEA, as both types of claims 
are premised upon an employer’s treatment of the same subclass of employ-
ees: older women or older men. From there, the question becomes whether 
other types of age-plus claims should be permitted as well. This section ex-
amines these issues, and argues that ADEA age-plus claims should be rec-
ognized, as under Title VII, when the statutorily protected characteristic 
(age) is combined with a plus factor involving another immutable character-
istic, like race or gender.253 
1. Textual Arguments for Recognizing Age-Plus Discrimination Claims 
The analysis of ADEA age-plus discrimination claims begins with the 
statute’s text.254 Briefly stated, the ADEA prohibits employment discrimina-
tion “because of [an] individual’s age,”255 a phrase the Gross Court equated 
with a “but-for” standard of causation.256 As a result of Gross—including 
the Court’s statement that “age [must be] the ‘reason’ that the employer de-
cided to act”257—claims alleging discrimination based on more than just age 
become textually problematic, such that when a discrimination claim is 
based on age plus an immutable characteristic, most courts require the 
plaintiff to argue age discrimination exclusively.258 
Although plausible, interpreting Gross to preclude age-plus discrimi-
nation claims is problematic for at least four reasons. First, the ADEA 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Sabina F. Crocette, Comment, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination Claims by 
Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis—A Pragmatic Model, 28 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 115, 116 & n.5 (1998). 
 253 See infra notes 254–341 and accompanying text; see also Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033 
(explaining that sex-plus discrimination claims are permitted where the plus factor pertains to an 
immutable characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right). 
 254 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 175–76. 
 255 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (2) (2012); see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 
F.3d 61, 74 (adopting this interpretation of the ADEA). 
 256 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 257 Id. (citation omitted). 
 258 See supra notes 184–208 and accompanying text. 
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makes it unlawful to discriminate “because of . . . age,”259 and the Supreme 
Court authorized sex-plus discrimination claims at a time when Title VII 
used identical statutory language.260 Second, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, 
the ADEA’s “because of . . . age”261 language is not preceded by the word 
“solely,” leaving room for other unlawful motives.262 Third, Gross’s state-
ment that “age [must be] the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act”263 
must be read in context, specifically, by recognizing that this statement was 
made in rejecting ADEA “mixed-motive” claims, which involve both lawful 
and unlawful motives.264 Such mixed-motive claims are different than those 
addressed in this Article, which instead involve a combination of unlawful 
motives, warranting a more exacting analysis. Finally, when examined in 
the specific context of plus discrimination, ordinary principles of but-for 
causation do not preclude discrimination claims involving multiple illegal 
motives.265 Each of these points are explained more fully below. 
When considering how Gross’s conception of but-for causation might 
apply in the context of age-plus discrimination, it is important to first rec-
ognize that but-for causation is a principle more often applied in tort law, 
one that is not typically considered when examining questions of motive.266 
Thus, analyzing but-for causation in the context of age-plus discrimination 
is at times awkward and complex.267 And yet, three potential interpretations 
                                                                                                                           
 259 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (2). 
 260 See Phillips, 500 U.S. at 543–44 (authorizing a sex-plus discrimination claim under Title VII 
in 1971). The statute at the time the Phillips case originated (and at the time the case was decided by 
the Supreme Court) did not include 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which was added in 1991 to allow par-
ties to bring a discrimination suit where a Title VII protected class “was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Compare Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1972) (amended 1991), and 42 
U.S.C. § 2000-e-2 (1964) (amended 1972). For more information on that development in the statute, 
see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Laws Through the Lens of Jury Instruc-
tions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 280–81 (2010) (explaining how Congress amended Title VII in 1991 by 
adding the “motivating factor” provision at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 261 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (2). 
 262 See Rehabilitation Act § 504, Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (2012)). The Rehabilitation Act provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by 
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 263 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citation omitted). 
 264 See id. at 175 (describing the issue before the Court as whether the text of the ADEA 
“authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 244–47 (1989) (describing the nature of a “mixed-motive” claim). 
 265 See infra notes 306–320 and accompanying text. 
 266 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 267 See id. 
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emerge. The most employer-friendly interpretation of the ADEA’s causation 
requirement for age-plus discrimination claims is the “sole cause” standard, 
one that certain courts, like Bauers-Toy and Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Associ-
ates, Inc., have utilized to reject such claims.268 The most employee-
friendly interpretation is the “motivating factor” standard, which applies 
under Title VII but which Gross refused to apply to the ADEA269 (despite a 
four-Justice dissenting argument to the contrary).270 A final interpretation—
one that traces the roots of but-for causation—falls between these extremes, 
is the most defensible, and leaves room for age-plus discrimination 
claims.271 
a. The ADEA Does Not Include a “Sole Cause” Standard 
Because the Gross majority rejected the “motivating factor” standard 
under the ADEA,272 this Article will begin by analyzing whether the 
ADEA’s causation requirement should be equated with a “sole cause” 
standard, including whether such a standard should preclude age-plus dis-
crimination claims.273 There are strong arguments against this interpretation. 
First, like age-plus discrimination claims, sex-plus discrimination claims are 
based on a combination of two or more characteristics, such as race and 
gender.274 And yet, sex-plus discrimination claims were declared valid as 
early as the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Phillips,275 a full twenty 
years before the amendments that added the “motivating factor” language to 
Title VII (in response to the Court’s 1989 “mixed-motives” decision in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins).276 Thus, when Phillips was decided, Title VII 
                                                                                                                           
 268 See supra notes 185–198 and accompanying text; see also Sole Cause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sole cause” as “[t]he only cause that, from a legal view-
point, produces an event or injury”). 
 269 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
 270 See id. at 180–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the phrase “because of” an indi-
vidual’s age means that age was “a motivating factor,” and stating that “[t]he most natural reading 
of [the ADEA’s ‘because of’ language] prohibits adverse employment actions motivated in whole 
or in part by the age of the employee”). 
 271 See infra notes 272–320 and accompanying text. 
 272 See Gross, 577 U.S. at 176. 
 273 See infra notes 272–320 and accompanying text. 
 274 See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing that in 
sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether the employer took an adverse employ-
ment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex,” and applying the sex-plus theory to a 
plaintiff who was allegedly discriminated against at least in part because of her gender where the 
“plus-factor” was sexual orientation (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 275 400 U.S. at 542. 
 276 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013) (explaining how 
the 1991 amendments to Title VII “codified the . . . lessened-causation framework of Price Wa-
terhouse in part” by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
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simply prohibited discrimination “because of” sex (without including the 
“motivating factor” language that exists today).277 And yet, that particular 
statutory language did not preclude plus discrimination claims, which often 
involve a combination of discriminatory motives, such that “‘because of’ 
. . . gender” cannot be read as “‘solely because of’ . . . gender.”278 There is 
no reason the ADEA’s identical statutory language should be interpreted 
differently. 
This argument is bolstered by recent opinions interpreting the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which uses the same “because of” lan-
guage employed by the ADEA.279 Interpreting the ADA’s “because of” lan-
guage, nearly every federal court of appeals has rejected the “sole cause” 
standard, often adopting a “motivating factor” standard instead.280 In one 
ADEA case, Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc in 2012 interpreted the 
                                                                                                                           
 277 See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543 n.* (quoting the language of Title VII in effect at that time). 
 278 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (noting that “the words ‘because of’ do not mean 
‘solely because of’”); see McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 
1996) (recognizing that every justice in Price Waterhouse agreed on this point); Price Water-
house, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837 (1964)) (“Congress specifically 
rejected an amendment that would have placed the word ‘solely’ in front of the words ‘because 
of.’”). 
 279 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–(b)(1) (2012) (prohibiting “discriminat[ion] . . . because of” a 
person’s disability). 
 280 See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the “sole causa-
tion” standard under the ADA and adopting the “motivating factor” standard); Head v. Glacier 
Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the motivating factor standard is the 
appropriate standard for causation in the ADA context”); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 
318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “to prevail under a ‘mixed-motives’ theory a plain-
tiff need only show that the unlawful motive was a ‘substantial motivating factor’ in the adverse 
employment action,” and finding “sufficient [evidence] to establish a prima facie case under . . . a 
‘mixed-motive’ theory” in a plaintiff’s ADA claim (internal quotation marks and alterations omit-
ted)); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that Con-
gress’s “elimination of the word ‘solely’ from the causation provision of the ADA suggests force-
fully that Congress intended the statute to . . . cover situations in which discrimination on the basis 
of disability is one factor, but not the only factor, motivating an adverse employment action”); 
Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 469–70 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the ADA does not impose a 
“solely by reason of” causation standard, and instead applying Title VII’s “motivating factor” 
standard (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); McNely, 99 F.3d at 1076 (finding that 
Congress’s use of the term “because of” in the ADA does not equate to “solely because of,” and 
holding instead “that the ADA imposes liability whenever the prohibited motivation makes the 
difference in the employer’s decision, i.e., when it is a ‘but-for’ cause”); Katz v. City Metal Co., 
87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (equating the ADA’s “because of” language to the “motivating 
factor” standard); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting 
the “motivating factor” standard for an ADA claim). But see Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, 
Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (ruling, in light of Gross, that “a plaintiff complaining of 
discriminatory discharge under the ADA must show that his or her employer would not have fired 
him but for his actual or perceived disability; proof of mixed-motives will not suffice”). 
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ADA’s “because of” language in light of both the Rehabilitation Act, which 
includes a “sole cause” standard, and the ADEA, which employs the same 
“because of” language found in the ADA.281 At the close of trial, the de-
fendant requested an instruction requiring the jury to find that the company 
fired the plaintiff “solely” because of her disability—a term in the Rehabili-
tation Act but not in the ADA.282 The plaintiff, on the other hand, asked for 
a jury instruction stating that the jury should rule in her favor if her disabil-
ity was “a motivating factor” in the company’s employment decision—a 
phrase that appears in Title VII but not in the ADA.283 The en banc Sixth 
Circuit ultimately rejected both formulations, however, given that neither 
standard appears in the ADA.284 
In rejecting the proposed “sole cause” formulation, the Lewis court 
reasoned that “[a] law establishing liability against employers who discrim-
inate ‘because of’ an employee’s disability does not require the employee to 
show that the disability was the ‘sole’ cause of the adverse employment ac-
tion.”285 The court also noted that no other federal circuit court had adopted 
the sole motivation standard for the ADA.286 Finally, although there were 
vigorous dissenting opinions in Lewis, no dissenting judge disagreed with 
the majority’s rejection of the “sole cause” standard.287 
Having rejected both the “sole cause” standard as well as the “motivat-
ing factor” standard, the Lewis court ultimately determined that the proper 
interpretation of both the ADA’s and the ADEA’s “because of” language is 
that each statute “prohibit[s] discrimination that is a ‘but for’ cause of the 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See 681 F.3d at 319; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer 
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s age”); id. § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency or by the United States Postal Service.”). 
 282 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 313–14. 
 283 Id. at 314. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 315–16. 
 286 See id. at 315 (citing cases from numerous federal appeals courts). 
 287 See id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that the court 
was unanimous in agreeing that the “sole cause” standard is inappropriate for ADA cases); id. at 
325 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority that ADA 
protection “does not hinge upon establishing that disability was the ‘sole’ cause of an adverse 
employment action”); id. at 331 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I concur 
with this Court’s welcome abandonment of its past interpretation of the [ADA], which read the 
word ‘solely’ into the ADA’s express ‘because of’ causation standard.”). 
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employer’s adverse decision.”288 Accordingly, Lewis suggests that age dis-
crimination may be proven with evidence that the plaintiff’s age was a but-
for cause of the employer’s action, as opposed to the but-for cause,289 an 
interpretation fully consistent with age-plus discrimination claims, which 
often involve a combination of unlawful motives.290 With an age-plus claim 
alleging discrimination on the basis of age and sex, for example, both age and 
sex are but-for causes of the alleged employment action. Change either of 
those variables, such as the employee’s gender, and the employer’s unique 
discriminatory animus disappears.291 In legitimate plus discrimination claims, 
there is more than one actual or but-for cause, but this should not preclude a 
finding of liability even under a but-for standard.292 
b. Title VII’s “Motivating Factor” Provision Does Not Preclude Age-Plus 
Discrimination Claims 
Having determined that the ADEA’s “because of” language does not 
equate to a “sole cause” standard of causation, and thus arguably permits 
                                                                                                                           
 288 Id., 681 F.3d at 321 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (stating that “[t]he ADEA and the ADA bar discrimination ‘because of’ an employee’s age or 
disability, meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s 
adverse decision” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 289 See id. 
 290 See supra notes 180–225 and accompanying text. 
 291 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (“In determining whether a particular factor was a 
but-for cause of a given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was present at the time of the 
event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had been absent, the event nevertheless would 
have transpired in the same way.”). 
 292 See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 65 (1956). The 
but-for causation test is described as follows:  
One fact or event, it is said, is a cause of another when the first fact or event is in-
dispensable to the existence of the second. In the trial of controversies this means 
that a defendant should not be charged with responsibility for a plaintiff’s harm un-
less we can conclude with some degree of assurance that the harm could not have 
occurred in the absence of the defendant’s misconduct.  
Id.; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (describing a homicide-by-
independent-assailants hypothetical, and explaining that in such “infrequent[]” cases, the criminal 
“result should be characterized as ‘death from two mortal blows,’” such that “the victim’s demise 
has as but-for causes each assailant’s blow”); see also Cox v. State, 808 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ark. 
1991) (“[W]here there are concurrent causes of death, conduct which hastens or contributes to a 
person’s death is a cause of death.”); People v. Bailey, 549 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1996) (“In 
assessing criminal liability for some harm, it is not necessary that the party convicted of a crime be 
the sole cause of that harm, only that he be a contributory cause that was a substantial factor in 
producing the harm.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(noting the existence of cases where an injured party can prove the existence of multiple, inde-
pendently sufficient factual causes). 
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discrimination claims based on multiple unlawful motives,293 the next ques-
tion is whether Title VII’s “motivating factor” provision, coupled with the 
absence of a similar provision in the ADEA, precludes ADEA plus discrim-
ination claims. Although a cursory comparison of the ADEA and Title VII 
might suggest that Congress intended to treat plus discrimination differently 
under each statute, Congress’s specific objective when enacting Title VII’s 
“motivating factor” provision belies such a conclusion. 
Simply stated, when Title VII was amended in 1991 to incorporate a 
“motivating factor” standard, that amendment was not meant to change the 
law with respect to plus discrimination claims, which often involve a com-
bination of discriminatory motives.294 Rather, the 1991 amendments simply 
clarified the standards of proof for the type of mixed-motive claim present 
in Title VII cases involving both a discriminatory motive and a legitimate 
one.295  
Prior to those amendments, the Supreme Court had ruled in Price Wa-
terhouse that an employer could fully escape liability under Title VII, even 
where evidence of discrimination exists, by showing that “it would have 
made the same [employment] decision even if it had not taken the [discrim-
inatory factor] into account.”296 In other words, an employer could escape 
Title VII liability altogether by “show[ing] that a discriminatory motive was 
not the but-for cause of the adverse employment action.”297 Congress disa-
greed, however, and through its 1991 amendments clarified that Title VII 
liability attaches when an employer is motivated at least in part by a dis-
criminatory factor, even if other permissible factors contributed to the em-
                                                                                                                           
 293 See supra notes 272–292 and accompanying text. 
 294 See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348–49 (explaining how the 1991 amendment adding the “moti-
vating factor” provision to Title VII “codified the . . . lessened-causation framework of Price Wa-
terhouse in part”); see also, e.g., Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (recognizing a sex-plus-race claim 
where the plaintiff’s sex and race were two discriminatory motives that formed the basis of the 
plaintiff’s claims). 
 295 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239–42. 
 296 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; see id. at 242 (“[A]n employer [in a Title VII sex 
discrimination suit] shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into ac-
count, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.”); id. at 244–45 
(declaring that “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part in 
an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it 
would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role”); id. at 
252 (“An employer may not meet its burden in [a mixed-motive] case by merely showing that at 
the time of the decision it was motivated only in part by a legitimate reason. . . . The employer 
instead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the 
same decision.”). 
 297 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348. 
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ployer’s decision.298 Accordingly, for a Title VII discrimination claim to 
prevail under the statute’s current iteration, a plaintiff need only present suf-
ficient evidence to conclude that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a “motivating factor”—as opposed to the sole “motivating factor”—for 
the adverse employment action at issue.299 From there, the employer may 
present the affirmative defense that it “would have taken the same action in 
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,”300 which, if successful, 
would no longer absolve the employer of liability, but instead impact the 
plaintiff’s available remedies.301 
In summary, the 1991 amendments to Title VII simply “substituted a 
new burden-shifting framework for the one endorsed by Price Waterhouse” 
in the type of mixed-motive case at issue there.302 Thus, although it may be 
tempting to identify the lack of any corresponding “motivating factor” lan-
guage in the ADEA as precluding age-plus discrimination claims (as some 
courts have done), this is a flawed approach given that ADEA age-plus dis-
crimination claims involve multiple unlawful motives, rather than a compet-
ing lawful and unlawful one, and otherwise bear little resemblance to Title 
VII mixed-motive claims. Moreover, when Congress amended Title VII in 
1991, its clear intention was to change the legal framework regarding Title 
VII mixed-motive claims; with that specific objective in mind, it would be 
illogical to conclude that Congress also intended to clarify the law regard-
ing ADEA plus discrimination claims.303 Title VII’s “motivating factor” 
provision simply ensures that a Title VII claim may still succeed even 
where the defendant shows that it “would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”304 Under an ADEA age-
plus discrimination claim, the analysis is entirely different.305 Accordingly, 
the mere existence of a “motivating factor” provision in one statute, Title 
                                                                                                                           
 298 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also Landgraf 
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1994) (explaining that, just two years after Price Wa-
terhouse, Congress passed the 1991 Act “in large part [as] a response to a series of decisions of 
this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964”). 
 299 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174; Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
 300 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 301 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (clarifying that a successful affirmative defense pre-
cludes money damages for the plaintiff and limits the available remedies to declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348–49 (discussing 
the distinction between the employer’s original defense pertaining to liability, and its current de-
fense pertaining to the plaintiff’s remedies). 
 302 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 349. 
 303 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a) (“Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . is 
further amended by adding the following new subsection: [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)]”). 
 304 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 305 See, e.g., Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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VII, should not be read to somehow preclude age-plus discrimination 
claims under another, the ADEA. 
c. Ordinary Principles of But-For Causation Do Not Preclude Plus 
Discrimination Claims 
The final question in this analysis is whether age-plus discrimination 
claims may co-exist with the ADEA’s standard of but-for causation as artic-
ulated in Gross, which requires proof, in an ADEA disparate treatment 
claim, “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employ-
ment action.”306 The answer to this question lies in Gross itself, including 
the authorities undergirding that opinion. 
In Gross, the Court interpreted “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s 
requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age” as re-
quiring proof “that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act,” a 
statement that appears to preclude age-plus claims.307 Nevertheless, imme-
diately after this statement, the Court cited its previous decision, Hazen Pa-
per Co. v. Biggins, for the proposition that such a “claim ‘cannot succeed 
unless the employee’s protected trait [e.g., age] actually played a role in [the 
employer’s decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on 
the outcome.’”308 The quoted passage from Biggins is not inconsistent with 
age-plus discrimination claims. 
In Biggins, the Court explained that “[i]n a disparate treatment case, li-
ability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actu-
ally motivated the employer’s decision.”309 This is because when an em-
ployer’s decision is motivated by age, the employer is likely acting not on 
the basis of individual ability, but rather as the result of “inaccurate and 
stigmatizing stereotypes” associated with aging workers—the very concern 
that led to the ADEA’s enactment.310 On the other hand, the Court ex-
plained, “[w]hen the employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors 
other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes dis-
appears.”311 For these reasons, the Court declared that “a disparate treat-
ment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually 
                                                                                                                           
 306 Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (“We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim 
pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ 
cause of the challenged adverse employment action.”). 
 307 Id. at 176. 
 308 Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). 
 309 Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610. 
 310 See id. at 610–11 (citation omitted). 
 311 See id. at 611 (emphasis added). 
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played a role in th[e] [employer’s decision-making] process and had a de-
terminative influence on the outcome.”312 
These pronouncements, which led the Gross Court to declare that the 
ADEA incorporates a standard of “but-for” causation,313 are fully consistent 
with age-plus discrimination claims. In an age-plus-sex claim, for example, 
the employee alleges that her employer discriminated against her due to 
both her age and sex. In that context, the employee may succeed on her 
claim by proving that age “actually motivated the employer’s decision”314 
and “had a determinative influence on the outcome,”315 because but-for the 
plaintiff’s age, the alleged adverse employment action would not have oc-
curred.316 This is unlike the Title VII mixed-motive context, where the pres-
ence of a legitimate motive serving as an independent basis for the employ-
er’s decision rules out a finding of but-for causation as to the illegitimate 
and unlawful motive.317 In the age-plus discrimination or multiple-motive 
context, the presence of a second discriminatory motive does not have the 
same effect.318 Accordingly, Gross’s but-for causation requirement, when 
read in context, does not preclude multiple-motive discrimination claims.319 
Returning to the Biggins statements, in a typical age-plus discrimina-
tion scenario, the employer’s decision would not be “wholly motivated by 
factors other than age,”320 but would instead embody the very type of age-
related stereotyping to which the ADEA is directed. The fact that the plain-
tiff’s gender may have also played a role does not diminish such unlawful 
                                                                                                                           
 312 Id. at 610. 
 313 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
 314 Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610. 
 315 Id.; cf. Pinkerton, 529 F.3d at 519 (rejecting the “sole causation” standard under the ADA 
and adopting the “motivating factor” standard, which in turn requires that “discrimination . . . 
must actually play a role in the employer’s decision making process and have a determinative 
influence on the outcome” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 316 See But-for Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “but-for cause” 
as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred”); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 
360 (describing “traditional principles of but-for causation” as “requir[ing] proof that the unlawful 
[action] would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the 
employer”); id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s but-for causation 
standard as one in which the plaintiff’s “claim will fail unless the complainant shows . . . that the 
employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but for a design to retaliate”). 
 317 See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348. 
 318 In an age-plus-sex claim, for example, when a plaintiff proves she was terminated because 
of both her age and gender—in other words, because she belonged to a subgroup of older female 
employees—but for the plaintiff’s age, she would not have been terminated. Likewise, but for the 
plaintiff’s gender, she would not have been terminated. In this example, if it were not for the 
plaintiff’s age and her gender, she would not have been terminated. See, e.g., Leal v. McHugh, 
731 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 319 See supra note 278. 
 320 Biggins, 507 U.S. at 611. 
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stereotyping; rather, it adds to it. In this respect, two wrongs do not make a 
right. Rather, two wrongs add up to discrimination—in this instance, against 
a particular subgroup of ADEA-protected employees who are just as deserv-
ing of ADEA protection as all other ADEA-protected employees. 
2. Proposed ADEA Amendment 
Despite the arguments set forth above for recognizing age-plus dis-
crimination claims under the ADEA’s existing text, the fact remains that 
Congress has amended Title VII to provide recovery under a “motivating 
factor” theory, but did not include similar language in the ADEA. As such, 
it is reasonable to conclude that Congress has made the “motivating factor” 
standard available to Title VII plaintiffs, but not to claimants under other 
civil rights statutes.321 From there, one might also conclude that without the 
benefit of a “motivating factor” standard, age-plus discrimination claims 
under the ADEA are unwarranted (as cases like Bauers-Toy and Cartee have 
determined).322 
Although the previous subsection demonstrates that Congress need not 
amend the ADEA to validate age-plus discrimination claims, a clarifying 
amendment to the ADEA may be appropriate in light of the judicial deci-
sions reading Gross to preclude age-plus claims. Accordingly, this Article 
proposes that Congress amend the ADEA to state that an ADEA plaintiff 
may prevail upon proof that his or her age was “a motivating factor for an 
adverse employment action, even though other discriminatory or illegiti-
mate factors may have also motivated the employer.”323 
Notably, this proposed ADEA amendment does not track the mixed-
motive provision of Title VII, given that its purpose is different. In the Title 
VII context, the point of the 1991 amendments was to clarify how Title VII 
applies in a mixed-motive case where an employer shows that it would have 
made the same employment decision even if it had not taken the proven 
discriminatory factor into account.324 By contrast, the point of amending the 
                                                                                                                           
 321 See Lewis, 681 F.3d at 317–21 (explaining two ways to view Congress’s 1991 amend-
ments to Title VII, including the interpretation that the “motivating factor” standard applies only 
to Title VII plaintiffs, and refusing to apply the “motivating factor” standard to the ADA). 
 322 See supra notes 184–208 and accompanying text. 
 323 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stating that an unlawful employment practice under 
Title VII is proven “when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice”), with Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (holding that, unlike Title VII claims, to 
prevail on an ADEA claim a plaintiff “must prove . . . that age was the ‘but for’ cause of the chal-
lenged adverse employment action”). 
 324 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
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ADEA would be to clarify that Gross’s but-for causation requirement325 
does not rule out age-plus discrimination claims brought by a particular 
subgroup of ADEA-protected employees, i.e., claims that often involve a 
combination of illicit motives. 
There are strong policy reasons to support this proposal. First, the Title 
VII sex-plus discrimination cases outlined in Part II demonstrate that dis-
crimination against subclasses of protected employees (such as black fe-
males) should not go unpunished.326 And although they are protected by a 
different statute, subgroups of employees in the ADEA’s protected class 
(such as older females) deserve the same protection, given that the discrim-
inatory variables—sex and race in the Title VII context, and sex and age in 
the ADEA context—each involve protected classifications and immutable 
characteristics the employee cannot change.327 Indeed, even the Bauers-Toy 
court, which rejected combined sex and age claims under Title VII and the 
ADEA, recognized plaintiff’s “valid argument that an individual could be 
treated unlawfully as a result of both age and gender.”328 
Second, because an employer in a Title VII plus discrimination case 
may not defend its discriminatory actions against a subgroup of protected 
employees, such as women with children, by showing that it does not dis-
criminate against other members of the protected group, such as women 
without children,329 a defendant in an ADEA case likewise should be pre-
cluded from asserting this type of “bottom line” defense regarding its treat-
ment of the entire protected class (individuals over the age of forty).330 And, 
the best way to preclude this defense is to allow a plaintiff to claim discrim-
ination at the subgroup level—in other words, to recognize age-plus dis-
crimination claims. Two illustrations might prove helpful. 
The first illustration is adapted from a 2018 case from the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.331 There, the 
plaintiff, named Deborah, was a fifty-six-year-old female employee termi-
nated from her job despite having received excellent performance reviews 
                                                                                                                           
 325 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. 
 326 See supra notes 52–123 and accompanying text. 
 327 See generally Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089–92 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 328 Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *6. 
 329 See supra note 60. 
 330 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451, 455 (1982) (stating that “Congress nev-
er intended to give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of 
race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employees’ group”). 
 331 See generally Famighette v. Rose, 2:17-cv-2553(DRH)(ARL), 2018 WL 2048371 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 2, 2018). 
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during her fourteen years of employment.332 For purposes of this illustra-
tion, assume that, after her termination, Deborah’s duties are taken over by 
two individuals: a fifty-eight-year-old man, and an unqualified and attrac-
tive twenty-three-year-old woman.333 On these facts, the court would likely 
dismiss Deborah’s Title VII claim of pure gender discrimination (because 
one of Deborah’s replacements is also a woman),334 and would likewise 
dismiss Deborah’s pure age discrimination claim (because one of Deborah’s 
replacements is an older man).335 In addition, because most courts do not 
recognize age-plus discrimination claims whatsoever, this court would like-
ly reject Deborah’s attempt to claim age-plus-sex discrimination.336 Never-
theless, if Deborah had evidence that she was discriminated against because 
she was an older woman, her discrimination claim should prevail.337 
For the second illustration, assume the owner of a small company har-
bors a particular animus against older female employees due to an archaic 
and stereotypical belief that older women should not be in the workforce. 
Also assume that this owner bears no such ill will towards older men or 
younger women, and that the owner states in a string of e-mails that he will 
refuse to hire older women given his discriminatory views towards those 
particular individuals. Finally, assume the owner then refuses to hire a fifty-
year-old female employee, regardless of her strong qualifications, for no 
reason other than that she falls within the category of persons whom he does 
not value, and that the employer instead hires a fifty-year-old male of similar 
qualifications. On these facts, without the benefit of the age-plus doctrine, the 
rejected applicant would likely be unable to prove pure age discrimination 
under the ADEA, given that the employer’s decision to hire a similarly 
qualified male of the same age as the rejected applicant tends to refute a 
                                                                                                                           
 332 See id. at *4 (summarizing allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint). 
 333 This particular allegation diverges somewhat from the actual allegation in Famighette, in 
which plaintiff claimed only that she was replaced by an unqualified twenty-three-year-old fe-
male. See id. at *1, *4. Nevertheless, there are cases similar to this where an employee is fired and 
her duties are distributed between more than one individual. See, e.g., McFadden-Pell v. Staten 
Island Cable, 873 F. Supp. 757, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining how a fifty-three-year-old wom-
an was discharged and her duties were distributed between two men who were ten to fifteen years 
younger). 
 334 See Famighette, 2018 WL 2048371, at *3 (dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimina-
tion claim because plaintiff’s sole replacement was also a woman). 
 335 Cf. id. at *4 (refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s ADEA claim because plaintiff alleged she was 
replaced without cause for someone who was significantly younger and inexperienced, which is 
sufficient to infer age discrimination). 
 336 See id. at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s age-plus-gender discrimination claim under the ADEA 
because “[c]ourts in the Second Circuit have not entertained mixed-motive cases for age discrimi-
nation”). 
 337 Cf. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1560–62 (permitting a plaintiff’s sex-plus-race discrimination claim); 
Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032–34 (same). 
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claim of age-based animus.338 As such, without the ability to argue age-plus 
discrimination, any ADEA claim the rejected applicant might assert would 
likely fail.339 Such a result, however, should not be condoned, particularly 
where, as here, there is clear evidence of discrimination against older fe-
males such as the rejected applicant (via the owner’s e-mails).340 
As with the sex-plus doctrine, a more wholesale judicial recognition of 
the age-plus doctrine would permit plaintiffs such as these to prevail on a 
discrimination claim even though other members of the ADEA’s protected 
class have not experienced the same discriminatory treatment.341 Accord-
ingly, precluding such plus claims altogether, based largely on misconcep-
tions regarding the lack of a mixed-motive provision in the ADEA, only 
closes the courthouse doors to individuals, like those described above, who 
have endured discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined a double judicial split in age discrimination 
cases, one pertaining to Title VII and the other to the ADEA. As to Title VII 
sex-plus-age claims, this Article contends that such claims are clearly au-
thorized by the well-established sex-plus discrimination doctrine and should 
be more routinely enforced to combat discrimination against older female 
employees. Further, this Article argues that ADEA age-plus discrimination 
claims should be deemed valid as well, particularly those combining age 
with another immutable characteristic, like race or gender. Here, this Article 
argues that the ADEA’s but-for standard of causation does in fact permit 
discrimination claims based on the combination of both age and another 
immutable characteristic, even though most courts to address age-plus dis-
crimination claims have ruled otherwise. Nevertheless, because Gross plau-
sibly could be read to preclude multiple-motive claims, and because Con-
                                                                                                                           
 338 See, e.g., Bauers-Toy, 2015 WL 13574291, at *4 (noting that “a plaintiff in an ADEA 
case must show that the discriminatory factor (age) was the only reason for the conduct”). 
 339 See id. 
 340 Although the variables are different, this hypothetical is similar to a recent case from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit involving a claim of age and disability dis-
crimination. See EEOC v. DynMcDermott Petrol. Operations, Co., 537 F. App’x 437, 448 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment for an employer 
and against a plaintiff who alleged both age and disability discrimination in part because e-mails 
indicated the employer did not want to hire the plaintiff “because of his age and his wife’s health 
problems”). 
 341 See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(noting that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title 
VII to affirm that plaintiffs can [claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfa-
vored class are discriminated against”). 
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gress has not clarified how the ADEA applies in cases involving multiple 
employer motives, some courts may remain hesitant to recognize ADEA 
age-plus discrimination claims. Accordingly, this Article proposes that Con-
gress amend the ADEA to state that an ADEA plaintiff may prevail upon 
proof that his or her age was “a motivating factor for an adverse employ-
ment action, even though other discriminatory or illegitimate factors may 
have also motivated the employer.” 
